




WHY LIBERTY JUDICIAL REVIEW IS AS LEGITIMATE AS 
EQUALITY REVIEW:  THE CASE OF GAY RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Carlos A. Ball * 
Although legal commentators these days rarely question the legitimacy of judges engaging in 
judicial review based on equality grounds, judicial review on substantive due process grounds 
remains highly controversial.   One of the principal reasons for this legitimacy disparity is the view 
that substantive due process calls on judges to incorporate their personal views and moral values 
into the constitutional analysis in ways that equality review does not. This Article introduces the 
concept of “equality’s dependence” to explain how value judgments that fall outside of egalitarian 
considerations must be incorporated into the analysis to give the concept of equality its normative 
bite.   The Article also uses gay rights constitutional cases to question the legitimacy disparity 
between liberty and equality review by showing how judges make normative judgments in equality 
gay rights cases that are surprisingly similar to the ones they make while engaging in substantive 
due process review.  These similarities undermine the view that equality is a more neutral or “self-
contained” constitutional norm than liberty, one that allows judges to decide cases without 
bringing to bear their normative values regarding the underlying moral and policy issues raised by 
the litigation. 
The Article also uses gay rights cases to explain why judicial review on liberty grounds can play a 
role in reinforcing democratic processes that is as salutary as that played by equal protection 
review.  In addition, the Article points to examples from gay rights constitutional litigation to 
question the widely held view that the striking down of legislation on substantive due process 
grounds inevitably imposes greater limitations on legislative discretion than does the voiding of 
laws on equality grounds.  The Article’s ultimate claim is that if judges and legal commentators 
are generally comfortable with the idea of courts measuring state action against constitutional 
principles of equality, then they should also be generally comfortable with courts doing the same 
with constitutional principles of liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a widely held view in American legal circles that if a law 
must be struck down on constitutional grounds, it is better to do it 
under equal protection principles than under the substantive com-
ponent of the Due Process Clause.1  Indeed, it sometimes seems that 
judicial review on liberty grounds will never overcome the specter of 
Lochner v. New York and its progeny.2  Almost everyone agrees that the 
Supreme Court in those cases improperly relied on substantive due 
process considerations to strike down economic and labor reforms 
 
 1 As Rebecca Brown explains, 
[f]or many decades, the Supreme Court has appeared more confident in its own 
legitimacy when protecting equality rather than liberty.  When it has addressed is-
sues of unequal treatment on the basis of race or other group characteristics—
even when judicial intervention meant the dismantling of entrenched local poli-
cy—the Court has not expressed the severe disquiet with its institutional role that 
we have come to expect when it addresses issues arising under the Liberty Clause. 
  Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (2002); see also 
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1982) (“Fifty years ago 
equality was dismissed as a legal argument of ‘last resort,’ one to be eschewed until all 
available ‘rights’ had been tried and rejected; today equality is becoming the argument of 
first choice, one that threatens to swallow ‘rights’ that once ranked far above it.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 2 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (striking law prohibiting bakers from 
working more than sixty hours a week on the ground that it violated the freedom to con-
tract as a protected liberty right under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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instituted during the Progressive and New Deal eras.3  And the 
Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade,4 in which it used substantive due 
process to hold that the Constitution affords women the right to ter-
minate pregnancies, remains its most controversial decision of the 
contemporary era.5 
While the legitimacy of substantive due process review has been 
controversial for most of the last century, there is not these days 
much disagreement among legal commentators (and judges) about 
the legitimacy of judicial review based on equality principles6—
though there are continued reservations expressed about judicial re-
view in general7 as well as frequent disagreements about how equality 
principles should be applied in individual cases.8 
 
 3 See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1564 (2004) (“The Lochner era has come to symbolize the practice of 
judges illegitimately legislating from the bench.”); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two 
Lochners:  The Untold Story of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2009) (“Lochner symbolizes the grave political dangers of subs-
tantive due process, with its ‘repulsive connotation of value-laden’ judicial review.”).  But 
see Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy:  Choosing a Legal Foundation for Gay 
Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 73, 84  (“[W]e should regard Lochner not as a constitutional 
horror story, but as a model for sensible constitutional deliberation.”). 
 4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 296 (2005) (noting that in 
deciding Roe, “the Court reached the most controversial result of the past half-century”); 
see also Lund & McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1556 (“Millions of Americans regard Roe as 
judicial authorization for mass murder, and understandably continue to oppose the 
Court’s approach to abortion.”). 
 6 As Rebecca Brown notes, “[o]ver the past century . . . both judges and scholars have in-
creasingly endorsed judicial review of equality claims . . . . By contrast, countermajorita-
rian concerns have led courts to refrain from judicial review of liberty claims.”).  Brown, 
supra note 1, at 1491 (footnotes omitted). 
   It should be noted that politicians and members of the public do not usually distin-
guish between judicial review that is grounded on equality grounds and one that is 
grounded in liberty doctrine.  For example, many who question the legitimacy of courts 
deciding the constitutionality of gay marriage bans seem to care little whether judges 
strike down those bans on equal protection or due process grounds.  For a discussion of 
the legitimacy of judicial review in the context of same-sex marriage, see Shannon Price 
Minter, The Great Divorce:  The Separation of Equality and Democracy in Contemporary Marriage 
Jurisprudence, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 89 (2010). 
 7 For a recent articulation of that skepticism, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).  For book-length critiques of judicial re-
view written by progressive scholars, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  The problematics of judicial review from 
the perspective of majoritarian democracy are usually traced back to the influential work 
of Alexander Bickel.  See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962). 
 8 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(striking down, by a 5–4 vote, student assignment plan that relied on racial classifications 
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There are several reasons for the legitimacy disparity between 
equality and liberty review.  One is the way in which courts used 
equality principles to end decades of de jure racial segregation.  If Roe 
is the most controversial Supreme Court ruling of the last fifty years, 
the equality case of Brown v. Board of Education9 remains the most cel-
ebrated in its history.10  To question the general legitimacy of judges 
striking down legislation under the Equal Protection Clause is in 
some sense to question the legitimacy of the judiciary’s contribution 
to ending the system of racial caste in America.  In short, “Brown [is] 
a paradigm of the courts doing something right, just as Lochner [is] a 
paradigm of the courts doing something wrong.”11 
Another reason for the legitimacy disparity between judicial re-
view grounded in equality and one grounded in the substantive com-
ponent of the Due Process Clause is the unique institutional function 
that judges are thought to play when interpreting the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  From this perspective, rulings under the latter provision 
are more legitimate than those under the former because they re-
quire judges to engage in what has come to be understood as a quin-
tessential judicial function, that is, the policing of the legislative 
branch to make sure that it sufficiently accounts for the interests of 
all groups when enacting legislation.12  This understanding of equality 
review, which owes much to the influential scholarship of John Hart 
Ely, views it as reinforcing rather than undermining representative 
democracy.13 
In contrast to the important institutional function that courts play 
when reviewing legislation under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, it is argued, calls 
for the exercise of a different type of judicial function, one that re-
quires judges essentially to legislate by taking sides in contested moral 
 
to promote diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding, by a 5–4 vote, 
law school’s use of race as an admissions factor in order to promote diversity). 
 9 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10 See Jeremy Waldron, supra note 7, at 1350 (noting that “the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. 
Board of Education provided a timely reminder of the service that the nation’s courts per-
formed in the mid-twentieth century by spearheading the attack on segregation and other 
racist laws”). 
 11 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1733, 1792 (1998). 
 12 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 152–53, 
161 (1980) (arguing that heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is ap-
propriate when the democratic process has failed to account for the interests of unpopu-
lar minorities). 
 13 See infra notes 110–13, 238–42 and accompanying text. 
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and policy disputes.14  As a result, liberty review is viewed by many as 
antidemocratic because it is thought to undermine rather than 
strengthen representative democracy.15 
In addition to greater institutional legitimacy, equality review also 
has a greater perceived remedial legitimacy.  The striking down of 
legislation under substantive due process principles is commonly 
thought to constitute a more intrusive form of judicial action be-
cause, in the words of Justice Robert Jackson, it “leaves ungoverned 
 
 14 See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.L. REV. 63, 78 (2006) 
(“Needless to say, the identification and protection of unenumerated, nonoriginalist con-
stitutional rights by the unelected Supreme Court—with the Court nullifying legislative 
judgments on fundamental questions of political morality—is a highly controversial prac-
tice.”); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1557 (“It is a commonplace observation—often 
repeated by members of the Court itself—that substantive due process makes judges into 
unelected and unremovable superlegislators.”); id. at 1604 (noting that substantive due 
process, unlike John Hart Ely’s procedural theory of judicial review, “has no . . . limiting 
principle, and there is no apparent reason to expect that its results will be systematically 
better than those produced by American democracy”). 
 15 See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1063 (2004) 
(“A . . . substantive due process holding is legitimately challenged on democratic 
grounds.  It overrules the views of citizens and their elected representatives, carving out a 
domain of liberty into which government may not enter.”).  Professor Brown notes that 
“in contrast to the new attitude about equality, the judicial guarantee of individual liberty 
has been branded antithetical to democracy.  Accordingly, claims of liberty are often un-
derstood as assertions of ‘trumps’ against majority decisions and thus in tension with 
democratic rule.  Courts have been wary.”  Brown, supra note 1, at 1494 (footnote omit-
ted); see also id. at 1501–02 (“Equality cases have not recently triggered an institutional 
alarm warning of antidemocratic judicial tyranny.  But repeatedly, against constitutional 
claims of liberty, that bell tolls.”).    
   The Supreme Court’s discomfort with liberty-based substantive rights may account 
for the oddity of decisions such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring the sterilization of some con-
victed felons.  Despite the statute’s seemingly clear liberty implications, the Court struck it 
down on equal protection grounds because the sterilization was mandated for those who 
committed certain crimes but not others.  For a critique of Skinner on this point, see 
Brown, supra note 1, at 1506–07.  For a defense of the Court’s decision to view the sterili-
zation statute as an impermissible form of class legislation, see Kenneth L. Karst, Why 
Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 283 (1983).    
   The Court’s predilection for equality claims over liberty ones also likely accounts for 
the conceptually odd “fundamental rights” component of the Equal Protection Clause, 
which the Court has applied in cases implicating the right to vote and to travel.  As Pro-
fessor Brown puts it, 
[t]his often inscrutable variation on the equality principle has perplexed and con-
cerned many commentators, primarily because it depends upon a blending of li-
berty and equality concepts.  It emerged when the Court began to identify certain 
liberties that, although unspecified in the Constitution, should receive special pro-
tection from legislative infringement.  Curiously, however, it grounded the special 
protection for unenumerated liberties in the Equal Protection Clause. 
  Brown, supra note 1, at 1508–09 (footnote omitted); see also Westen, supra note 1, at 561–
64 (criticizing the “fundamental rights” equality cases for focusing on equality considera-
tions rather than on the relevant underlying substantive rights). 
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and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable.”16  
Successful liberty-based challenges, in other words, deprive the State 
of the authority to regulate in certain areas.  In contrast, the striking 
down of legislation under equal protection principles is generally 
understood to be less intrusive of the legislature’s prerogatives be-
cause it remains free to continue to regulate in the area in question, 
albeit by using constitutionally appropriate classifications.17 
Later in this Article, I return to the institutional and remedial ar-
guments in support of the view that equality review is more legitimate 
than liberty review.18  Most of this Article, however, addresses an addi-
tional reason for the widely shared skepticism about liberty review, 
namely, that it encourages (or allows) judges to assess the constitu-
tionality of legislation based on their personal values and moral 
views.19  Although this criticism, grounded in concerns about greater 
 
 16 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 17 See infra notes 269–79 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 I recognize that some of the perceived illegitimacy of liberty review is due to textual con-
siderations.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in providing that no 
state “shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, seems to prohibit only procedurally improper deprivations 
of liberty without explicitly recognizing any substantive protections.  See Conkle, supra 
note 14, at 69 (“By its terms, the language suggests no limitation on procedurally proper 
deprivations, nor does it authorize the recognition of substantive constitutional rights.”).  
(The same is true of the almost identically phrased Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V.)  “[D]espite the strength of this textual argu-
ment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected it.”  Conkle, supra note 14, at 69.  In 
fact, since “substantive due process has become an entrenched part of constitutional law,” 
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1062, it is appropriate to look beyond purely textual considera-
tions to assess the overall legitimacy of liberty review.  See Ryan C. Williams, The One and 
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 411 (2010) (“[E]ven the most ardent 
textualists acknowledge that constitutional provisions may sometimes reflect specialized 
‘term-of-art’ meanings that are not readily apparent from the meanings of the individual 
words comprised therein.”).    
   Another reason why some question the legitimacy of substantive due process review is 
because of its supposed inconsistency with the intent of those who drafted the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1532 (2008) (“Under an originalist reading of 
the Due Process Clauses, . . . there is no requirement that legislation be ‘reasonable’ in 
the eyes of federal and state judges.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This Court’s substantive due process 
framework fails to account for both the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the his-
tory that led to its adoption . . . .”).  Although I do not in this Article address the critique 
of liberty review that is grounded in considerations of original intent, it is worth noting 
that there is a rich literature that questions the historical accuracy of that critique.  See, 
e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered:  Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substan-
tive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist 
Defense of Substantive Due Process:  Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 
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judicial subjectivity, follows to some extent the institutional critique 
already noted, it is a conceptually distinct criticism.20  That is, the in-
stitutional critique is based on the idea that the striking down of legis-
lation on liberty grounds undermines rather than reinforces repre-
sentative democracy.21  In contrast, the subjectivity critique is based 
on the notion that liberty review impermissibly calls on judges to rely 
on their personal values and preferences in assessing the constitutio-
nality of state action.22  Interestingly, that same criticism is not usually 
raised against equality review.23 
 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990); Williams, supra note 19; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he historical evidence suggests that, at least by the time of 
the Civil War if not much earlier, the phrase ‘due process of law’ had acquired substan-
tive content as a term of art within the legal community.”). 
 20 See J. Skelley Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (1980) (noting that the Court’s rulings during the Lochner era “were not only 
merely undemocratic . . . .  Precisely because they were informed [by the Justices’] view of 
right policy, rather than a legal principle, the decisions were [also] primarily in one di-
rection”). 
 21 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 22 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 31 (1990) (asserting that substantive due process has been used “countless times . . .  
by judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a document that, most inconve-
niently, does not contain those beliefs”); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1560 (“[D]ue 
process has continued to provide a textual thunderbolt that Olympian judges can hurl at 
any law that offends them.”); id. at 1603 (“[S]ome Justices have simply assumed that the 
Constitution must include a provision that gives them the discretionary power to impose 
their personal visions of justice and what they think of as the more transcendent dimen-
sions of liberty.”); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting 
that great care must be taken “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be 
subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406 
(7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Substantive due process is a shorthand for 
a judicial privilege to condemn things the judges do not like or cannot understand.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 23 Andrew Koppelman, for example, has noted that while there is some “indeterminacy” in 
equality claims that leave room for judicial discretion, see Andrew Koppelman, The Right to 
Privacy?, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105, 116, the degree of such is much greater in substantive 
due process cases because “[t]he privacy doctrine inappropriately requires judges to de-
cide what is important in life.”  Id. at 106; see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d. 1428, 
1440 (“[T]he practical difficulties of defining the requirements imposed by equal protec-
tion, while not insignificant, do not involve the judiciary in the same degree of value-
based line-drawing that the Supreme Court in Hardwick found so troublesome in defining 
the contours of substantive due process.”), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988); Wil-
liam D. Araiza, Foreign and International Law in Constitutional Gay Rights Litigation:  What 
Claims, What Use, and Whose Law?, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 457 (2006) (noting that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas “was aggressive, in that it explicitly 
went out of its way to rely on a broader and more value-laden grounding—substantive 
due process, rather than equal protection—to reach its result”).  
 The perception of substantive due process as calling (or allowing) for a greater de-
gree of judicial subjectivity (or activism) than equal protection has not been consistent in 
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The crux of the complaint behind the subjectivity criticism of li-
berty review goes to the nature of the normative assessments that 
judges must make in adjudicating constitutional claims.  When 
viewed in comparative terms, the subjectivity criticism holds that the 
Equal Protection Clause calls for a type of judicial review that is neu-
tral in ways that the application of substantive due process principles 
is not.24  This is why the perceived danger of judges “legislating from 
the bench” seems to be more acute in the context of liberty cases 
than in equality ones.25 
 
our history.  Writing in 1979, for example, Professor Ira Lupu claimed that “the last two 
decades have revealed that the equal protection clause is at least as easily abused as [is 
substantive due process].  Its relative infancy as an activist tool and its textual invitation to 
excess in the name of equality have combined to overwhelm the forces of restraint.”  Ira 
C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1075–76 
(1979); see also id. at 994 (“The equal protection clause did for the Warren Court precisely 
what the due process clause did for the Lochner-era Court—it served as a vehicle for judi-
cial intervention in state policy choices to promote a set of values responsive to the Justic-
es’ vision of political and social ideals.”); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 341 (1949) (noting that the Equal Protection 
Clause, “characterized by Mr. Justice Holmes as ‘the last resort of constitutional lawyers,’ 
has long been treated by the Court as a dubious weapon in the armory of judicial re-
view”). 
 24 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on 
a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 (1972) (ar-
guing that because equal protection analysis focuses on means and not ends it avoids the 
dangers of “dogmatically imposed judicial values”); Wright, supra note 20, at 17–18 (ar-
guing that “the equal protection clause has only a limited utility for imposing judicial 
views on the legislative process . . . . Unlike the . . . due process clause, the equal protec-
tion clause cannot be invoked to require either the national government or the states to 
create wholly new rights in their residents”); see also Lupu, supra note 23, at 985 (arguing 
that the Equal Protection Clause “cannot and should not bear a substantive content”).  
Kenneth Karst has taken issue with the notion that the Equal Protection Clause lacks 
substantive content: 
The search for a “central guiding principle” [in equality cases] seems to have been 
inhibited by a widely shared assumption that the equal protection clause lacks 
substantive content.  That assumption is mistaken.  Equality, as an abstraction, may 
be value-neutral, but the fourteenth amendment is not.  The substantive core of 
the amendment, and of the equal protection clause in particular, is a principle of 
equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to 
be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating 
member. 
  Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreword:  Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977). 
 25 One commentator has recently explained that 
[f]or the general purpose of protecting individual freedom . . . an equal protec-
tion approach is preferable to a substantive due process approach, which has ex-
posed the Court to charges of “legislating from the bench.”  Whereas an equal 
protection approach just involves courts in a comparative analysis of statutes that 
might burden groups of individuals differently, a substantive due process ap-
proach often requires that courts “identify unenumerated constitutional rights.” 
  Patrick M. Garry, An Equal Protection View of the First Amendment, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
787, 798–99 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also Conkle, supra note 14, at 66 (“The Su-
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In this Article, I use gay rights cases to question the notion that 
equality review restrains or cabins judges’ subjective views about the 
underlying moral and policy issues raised by constitutional litigation 
in ways that liberty review does not.  In particular, I highlight the cru-
cial role that judges’ normative assessments—regarding questions 
such as the relevancy of sexual orientation in public policy matters, 
the purpose of the institution of marriage, and the capability of same-
sex couples to form committed and loving relationships—play in both 
equality and liberty gay rights cases. 
My objective in this Article is not to question the legitimacy of 
equality review but is instead to bring greater respectability to liberty 
review.26  If there is little reason to question the appropriateness of 
judges making normative assessments in applying constitutional 
equality principles when deciding gay rights cases, and if those as-
sessments are frequently similar to the ones that judges make in con-
sidering gay rights claims raising liberty questions, then there is less 
of a reason to question the appropriateness of judges making norma-
tive judgments in applying substantive due process principles when 
deciding gay rights cases. 
There are two points that I make in the prior sentence that need 
elaboration.  First, notice that I am speaking generally about types (or 
categories) of judgments, not about any particular judgment.  It is 
important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the legitimacy of 
judges making normative assessments about moral or policy questions 
as part of their equality and liberty constitutional analyses, and, on 
the other, the appropriateness or correctness of particular judgments 
in any given case.  In this Article, I am interested in the former issue 
and not in the latter. 
 
preme Court’s welter of decisions and its confusing doctrinal standards have emboldened 
the Court’s critics, who view the ‘doctrine’ of substantive due process as little more than a 
judicial charade, an excuse for selective and unprincipled ‘legislating from the bench.’”). 
 26 This Article does not address the question of whether the constitutional review of legisla-
tion by judges is something to be praised or criticized.  (For recent elaborations on that 
issue, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1693 (2008); Waldron, supra note 7.)  Instead, the question I address here is the ex-
tent to which, assuming that the judicial review of legislation is proper, equality review is 
more legitimate than liberty review.    
   In addition, while this Article discusses equality and liberty issues in gay rights cases, it 
does not address how questions of judicial review and institutional competence impact 
the interests of sexual minorities.  For scholarship on those issues, see, e.g., Darren Le-
nard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court 
Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2005); Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships:  
Comparative Institutional Analysis, Contested Social Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28 
U. HAW. L. REV. 23 (2005); Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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Second, because I limit my discussion in this Article to gay rights 
cases, I cannot claim conclusively that the similarities in the equality- 
and liberty-based normative assessments that judges make in deciding 
constitutional claims raised in gay rights litigation are also found in 
lawsuits raising other issues.  But if I am correct that many of the 
normative assessments judges make in deciding equality gay rights 
cases are similar to those they make in adjudicating liberty gay rights 
claims, that renders suspect the notion that substantive due process 
intrinsically calls on judges to make subjective assessments based on 
their personal views that can be largely avoided in equality cases. 
The question may be asked why this Article focuses on gay rights 
cases as opposed to other constitutional disputes.  In my estimation, 
gay rights constitutional litigation is a particularly helpful vehicle for 
comparing equality and liberty analyses because that litigation fre-
quently raises claims under both theories.27  This has been the case in 
lawsuits involving a wide variety of issues, including sodomy laws,28 
same-sex marriage bans,29 gay adoption bans,30 and the military’s for-
mer “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.31  The dual equality and liberty 
claims raised in many gay rights constitutional cases allows for a fruit-
 
 27 A quarter of a century ago, Supreme Court Justice Paul John Stevens noted a link be-
tween liberty and equality in gay rights cases when he wrote that 
[a]lthough the meaning of the principle that “all men are created equal” is not 
always clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen has the same interest in “li-
berty” that the members of the majority share.  From the standpoint of the indi-
vidual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding 
how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in 
his personal and voluntary associations with his companions.  State intrusion into 
the private conduct of either is equally burdensome. 
  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218–19 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 28 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (adjudicating constitutional challenge to 
law criminalizing same-sex sodomy that raised both equality and liberty claims); Jegley v. 
Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (same); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 
(Ky. 1993) (same); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (same); Campbell v. 
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (same). 
 29 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (adjudicating constitutional chal-
lenge to same-sex marriage ban that raised both equality and liberty claims); Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (same); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (same); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) 
(same). 
 30 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 
2004) (adjudicating constitutional challenge to gay adoption ban that raised both equali-
ty and liberty claims); In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G., 54 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (same). 
 31 See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (adjudicating constitutional challenge 
to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that raised both equality and liberty claims); Witt v. 
Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
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ful comparison of the ways in which judges make normative judg-
ments under both theories.32 
The fact that gay people are seeking judicial recognition of liberty 
interests in matters related to sexuality and relationships already en-
joyed by heterosexuals explains why so many gay rights constitutional 
cases raise both equality and liberty claims.33  This has meant, in turn, 
that commentators have paid significant attention to the interplay of 
equality and liberty in gay rights constitutional litigation.34  That lite-
 
 32 In contrast, for example, the constitutionality of abortion restrictions has been litigated 
almost exclusively under the Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  (This is so despite the opinion of several commentators 
that equal protection principles provide more appropriate grounds for analyzing abor-
tion-related issues.  See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality 
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:  
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 261 (1992); see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955, 963 (1984) (arguing that abortion regulations should be analyzed from the 
perspective of sex equality).)  Also, in contrast to gay rights matters, constitutional issues 
related to race and gender have been litigated almost exclusively under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 33 History shows how liberty claims of gay people follow (usually by a few decades) those of 
heterosexuals.  For example, after the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional 
rights of straight individuals in matters related to sexual intimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, 
see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing constitutional right of un-
married individuals to use contraceptives when married couples are permitted to use 
them); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down statute prohibiting 
use of contraceptives as applied to married couples), gay rights advocates tried to get the 
same recognition for gay people, first unsuccessfully in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), and then successfully in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  Similarly, the Su-
preme Court, starting in the late 1960s, recognized that heterosexuals have a fundamen-
tal right to marry.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967).  Approximately thirty years later, gay rights advocates began regularly asking 
courts to rule that same-sex couples enjoy the same right.  See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 34 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1201–14 (2000) (arguing that due process principles have played the 
primary role in constitutionally advancing the interests of lesbians and gay men, while 
equality has played a subsidiary role); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword:  Loving Lawrence, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2004) [hereinafter Karlan, Loving Lawrence] (arguing Lawrence 
“is a case about liberty that has important implications for the jurisprudence of equality”); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) [hereinafter Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amend-
ment] (using Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), among others, to show that “the ideas of 
equality and liberty expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each 
emerge from and reinforce the other”); Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Justice Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 63 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality] (pointing to gay rights cases to show 
how “liberty can serve to backstop equality.  That is, liberty arguments can explain why 
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rature, however, has focused mostly on what the authors believe are 
the proper interpretations or applications of the two constitutional 
principles rather than, as this Article does, on the ways in which both 
principles call on judges to make similar normative judgments in ad-
judicating the underlying claims. 
This Article will proceed as follows.  In Part I, I explain why judges 
are required, under different theories of substantive due process, to 
make normative judgments in controversial matters of morality and 
policy to determine whether the legislation in question impermissibly 
violates constitutionally protected liberty.35  Although what I here call 
“liberty’s subjectivity” has been recognized by others before—in fact, 
 
two classes of individuals cannot be treated unequally.”); Koppelman, supra note 23 (ar-
guing that equality makes for a better constitutional grounding for gay rights claims than 
does privacy); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1994) 
(same); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:  A Note on the Relationship 
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1989) (arguing, in 
the aftermath of Hardwick, that the Due Process Clause is generally backwards-looking in 
that its substantive applicability is governed by the nation’s traditions while the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is generally forward-looking in that it frequently requires the overturning 
of established practices); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to 
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (arguing that the constitutionality of same-sex mar-
riage bans should be analyzed under the fundamental rights branch of equal protection 
doctrine because doing so acknowledges that the issue raises both liberty and equality 
concerns); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The Fundamental Right That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (noting that “Lawrence, more than 
any other decision in the Supreme Court’s history, both presupposed and advanced an 
explicitly equality-based and relationally situated theory of substantive liberty”); Kenji Yo-
shino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (2011) (arguing that “[b]y de-
ciding Lawrence on liberty grounds, the Court quieted pluralism anxiety” because it 
viewed the case “not [as] a group-based equality case about gays, but rather [as] a univer-
sal liberty case about the right of all consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy in the 
privacy of their homes”). 
   There has also been much commentary in the law reviews recently on the intersec-
tion of liberty and equality considerations generally, see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liber-
ties of Equal Citizens:  Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) 
(calling “attention to the ways in which equal citizenship’s antisubordination values have 
contributed to individual liberties, as those liberties are embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause”); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Bor-
rowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,  461 (2010) (exploring “the practice of importing doc-
trines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into 
another for persuasive ends” and paying “particular attention to cases in which the Court 
has traded between liberty and equality”), and on issues that go beyond gay rights.  See, 
e.g., David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907 (2007) (arguing 
that a holistic understanding of Fourteenth Amendment provisions best protects wom-
en’s reproductive freedoms); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty:  Assisted Reproduction Technology, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008) (exploring notion of equal liberty in the context of 
assisted reproduction technology); cf. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (proposing an equal liberty ap-
proach to the Religious Clauses). 
 35 See infra notes 56–84 and accompanying text. 
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as we have seen, it is one of the principal criticisms of substantive due 
process doctrine36—what has not been recognized is that that subjec-
tivity is analogous to what I here call “equality’s dependence.” 
In order to explain what I mean by equality’s dependence, Part I 
builds on an article by Professor Peter Westen37 to explore why nor-
mative assessments that fall outside of egalitarian considerations must 
be incorporated into the constitutional analysis in order to decide 
whether equality principles are applicable in any given case.38  This 
means that judicial determinations of what equality demands can be 
as dependent on normative judgments regarding the moral and poli-
cy issues raised by a particular controversy as are judicial determina-
tions of what constitutionally protected liberty requires.39  As a result, 
equality, as a constitutional principle, is not necessarily any more self-
contained or neutral than is liberty. 
In Part II, I explore the normative assessments that judges have 
made in deciding liberty claims in sodomy and same-sex marriage 
cases.40  I then look at the normative assessments that different state 
supreme courts have made in analyzing same-sex marriage bans un-
der equality principles and that the Supreme Court made in deciding 
Romer v. Evans.41  In doing so, I will show that judges adjudicating li-
berty and equality gay rights cases make surprisingly similar types of 
normative assessments—neither the discretion that is part of those 
assessments nor the scope of the normative inquiry varies in any sig-
nificant way depending on whether the gay rights claim is based on 
liberty or on equality considerations. 
Finally, in Part III, I return to the institutional and remedial bases 
for the greater perceived legitimacy of equality judicial review over 
liberty review already noted42 and find them generally wanting, at 
least in the context of gay rights jurisprudence.  Specifically, regard-
ing institutional legitimacy, I argue that judges, in assessing liberty 
claims in gay rights cases can reinforce democratic processes in ways 
that are similar to what is expected of them when they engage in 
equality review.43  In addition, regarding remedial legitimacy, I claim 
 
 36 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
 37 Westen, supra note 1. 
 38 See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 112–66 and accompanying text. 
 41 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (assessing constitutionality of a state constitutional provision prohi-
biting state and local governments from providing antidiscrimination protection to les-
bians, gay men, and bisexuals); see infra notes 167–223 and accompanying text. 
 42 See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 238–65 and accompanying text. 
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that the striking down of legislation under liberty review in gay rights 
constitutional cases does not restrict the authority of the legislature to 
regulate in matters of sexuality and intimate relationships to a signifi-
cantly greater degree than does the invalidation of laws under equali-
ty review.44 
Three last points need addressing before proceeding.  First, it is 
important to distinguish the types of normative assessments, based on 
considerations of morality and policy, that I believe judges must make 
in deciding both equality and liberty gay rights claims from the 
judgments of political morality that Ronald Dworkin has argued judges 
must rely on to decide constitutional disputes.45  As is well known, 
Dworkin has defended what he calls a moral understanding of the 
Constitution, one that requires judges to “interpret and apply the[] 
[Constitution’s] abstract clauses [like those pertaining to equal pro-
tection and due process] on the understanding that they invoke mor-
al principles about political decency and justice.”46  My focus in this 
Article is not on the deeper principles of political philosophy that 
Dworkin references but is instead on narrower (and less ambitious) 
moral and policy judgments on questions such as the relevancy of 
sexual orientation for the distribution of rights and benefits, the core 
purposes of the institution of marriage, and the capability of lesbians 
and gay men to participate in committed and loving relationships.  It 
may very well be that the normative assessments that judges must 
make in both the equality and liberty gay rights cases that I discuss in 
Part II are themselves dependent on the types of judgments of politi-
cal morality that Dworkin emphasizes in his work, but that is an issue 
I do not explore here.47 
Second, in contending that constitutional principles of equality 
and liberty call on judges to make similar normative assessments in 
gay rights cases, I do not mean to suggest that there are no important 
 
 44 See infra notes 266–96 and accompanying text.  I also question the notion that successful 
equality-based challenges, and the resulting incentives to broaden the impact of legisla-
tion, always serve to protect against arbitrary and unreasonable government actions.  See 
infra notes 297–315 and accompanying text. 
 45 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 46 Id. at 2. 
 47 In some of my other writings, I have explored the intersection of gay rights and questions 
of political morality, but I have done so from the perspective of political, rather than con-
stitutional, theory.  See, e.g., CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS:  AN 
EXPLORATION IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2003) [hereinafter BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY 
RIGHTS]; Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443 (2000); 
Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage:  Looking Beyond Politi-
cal Liberalism, 85 GEO. L. J. 1871 (1997). 
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differences between the adjudication of equality and liberty claims.  
Those differences clearly exist, as is reflected in legal doctrine.  For 
example, the Court’s tiered form of equality review, which calls for 
heightened scrutiny under some circumstances, requires the asking 
of questions (such as whether the group alleging improper differen-
tial treatment has suffered a history of discrimination48 and whether 
the trait in question affects the ability of individuals to contribute to 
society)49 that are not constitutionally relevant when judges grapple 
with substantive due process issues. 
There are also deeper, more conceptual differences between con-
stitutionally protected equality and liberty.  For example, the equality 
analysis is intrinsically relational in ways that the liberty one is not.  
That is, equality requires an assessment of how some groups have 
been treated under the law in relation to others in ways that the liber-
ty analysis, which focuses on questions of governmental interference 
with certain choices made by individuals, does not.50  Despite these 
differences, I believe there are crucial similarities in the types of 
normative assessments required of judges under both constitutional 
principles, similarities that do not allow for easy generalizations re-
garding the degree of subjectivity that accompanies the two forms of 
analysis. 
Finally, I do not in this Article argue that liberty review is prefera-
ble to equality review in matters related to gay rights (or to any other 
issue),51 nor do I argue for a particular understanding (whether 
broad or narrow) of substantive due process protections.  Instead, my 
objective is to question the widely held view that judicial review based 
on liberty considerations is less legitimate than equality review. 
 
 48 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–32 (1996); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). 
 49 See, e.g., Cleburne v. City of Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 50 Peter Westen explains this point through the following examples: 
[T]he right of a person to the privacy of his home is a noncomparative right be-
cause it can be ascertained without reference to the relative status of other per-
sons.  In contrast, the right of black children to attend the public schools on the 
same basis as white children is a comparative right because the rights of black 
children are determined by reference to the privileges enjoyed by white children. 
  PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF 
“EQUALITY” IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 131–32 (1990); see also Kenneth W. Simons, 
Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985) (“A right to equal treat-
ment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because another person 
or class receives it.  The claim to that treatment is not absolute, but relative to whether 
others receive it.”). 
 51 For an argument that progressives in general, and gay rights supporters in particular, 
should emphasize liberty over equality claims, see Yoshino, supra note 34, at 793–97. 
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I.  NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS IN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY REVIEW 
One of the frequent criticisms of substantive due process doctrine 
is that it encourages (or allows) judges to incorporate into the consti-
tutional analysis their personal views about the moral and policy posi-
tions behind the legislation that is subject to challenge.52  In contrast, 
this objection is not usually raised against equality review.53  In this 
section of the Article, I explore the nature of the normative assess-
ments that seems to inhere in liberty cases regardless of which theory 
of substantive due process a court applies.54  I then explain why it is 
that, as a conceptual matter, equality review can be as dependent on 
judges’ normative assessments regarding the moral and policy issues 
raised by the controversies in question as is liberty review.55 
A.  Liberty’s Subjectivity 
In a recent article, Professor Daniel Conkle explores three differ-
ent theories of substantive due process.56  Under the first theory, 
judges determine whether the claimed right is consistent with the na-
tion’s history and traditions.57  This was the approach the Supreme 
Court took in Bowers v. Hardwick when it relied on the country’s long 
history of sodomy regulations to hold that consensual and private 
same-sex sexual conduct was not constitutionally protected.58  The 
Court more recently also embraced a strong historical approach to 
substantive due process in Washington v. Glucksberg, a case in which it 
rejected the argument that the Constitution recognized a fundamen-
tal right to assisted suicide because of what it argued was the “consis-
tent and almost universal tradition [in this country] that has long re-
jected [such a] right.”59  The Court added that, as a methodological 
matter, “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practic-
es . . . provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking’ 
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”60 
A second substantive due process theory, which also finds support 
in some of the Court’s decisions, is what Professor Conkle calls that of 
 
 52 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See infra notes 56–84 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 85–107 and accompanying text. 
 56 See Conkle, supra note 14. 
 57 Id. at 83–90. 
 58 478 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1986). 
 59 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). 
 60 Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
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“reasoned judgment.”61  Under this approach, “the Supreme 
Court . . . evaluate[s] the liberty interest of the individual and 
weigh[s] it against competing governmental concerns, determining 
on this basis whether the liberty interest deserves protection as a con-
stitutional right.”62  Conkle argues that the Court implicitly adopted 
this theory in first recognizing a woman’s constitutional right to ter-
minate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade63 and then more explicitly em-
braced it in reaffirming such a right almost twenty years later in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.64  In this latter 
case, Conkle notes, the Court relied on “reason” and “fairness” to de-
fend the notion, first embraced in Roe, that viability outside the womb 
is the crucial moment at which the State’s interest in protecting the 
fetus outweighs the privacy and autonomy based rights of the preg-
nant woman.65 
Conkle also argues that when the Court in Lawrence v. Texas struck 
down a sodomy statute partly because of an “emerging awareness”66 
that considerations of liberty protect the sexual choices of individu-
als, it was following a third substantive due process theory, one that 
looks to evolving national values to assess the constitutionality of leg-
islation.67  Conkle claims that this third approach, properly unders-
tood, best balances the need for some objectivity in the Court’s due 
process analysis—assured through a requirement that its rulings be 
grounded in values that “command widespread contemporary sup-
 
 61 Conkle, supra note 14, at 66. 
 62 Id. at 99–100. 
 63 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 64 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 65 Conkle, supra note 14, at 104–05. 
 66 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (noting “an emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives 
in matters pertaining to sex”). 
 67 Conkle, supra note 14, at 121–23.  Conkle notes that the “evolving national values” ap-
proach was suggested by Justice John Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman: 
Declaring that due process reflects “the balance struck by this country,” Harlan 
mentioned not only “the traditions from which it developed” but also “the tradi-
tions from which it broke,” because “tradition is a living thing.”  Exactly what Har-
lan meant is unclear, but this language suggests that substantive due process 
should protect not only historical rights but also rights that have emerged over 
time, gaining sufficient support in our contemporary law and culture that the Su-
preme Court can properly recognize their existence without engaging in “un-
guided speculation.” 
  Conkle, supra note 14, at 124 (footnote omitted).  I explore Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe 
below when discussing the normative assessments that some Supreme Court Justices have 
reached when considering the constitutionality of sodomy laws.  See infra notes 115–27 
and accompanying text. 
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port”68—with the need for interpretative flexibility and dynamism giv-
en that the nation’s values change over time.69 
For our purposes, the important point to note is that all three 
theories of substantive due process require judges to make normative 
assessments in establishing the appropriate baseline with which to de-
termine whether the legislation subject to challenge impermissibly 
violates constitutionally protected liberty.  This point is perhaps 
clearest in the context of the reasoned judgment approach, which 
Conkle argues comes close to Ronald Dworkin’s view that judges 
must make judgments of political morality in deciding difficult con-
stitutional questions.70  But the same is true of the other two substan-
tive due process theories.  Under the “evolving values” approach, the 
Court must apply its reasoned judgment to determine whether a par-
ticular value, which may be widely but not uniformly shared across 
the nation, constitutes a proper basis for the recognition of a funda-
mental right under the Liberty Clause.  As Conkle explains, 
[t]he Court must decide, as an independent normative judgment, 
whether the asserted right deserves national constitutional protection, 
thereby protecting the right even in states that choose not to follow the 
general national pattern.  In resolving this question, the Court inevitably 
must employ a methodology analogous to that required by the theory of 
reasoned judgment.  It must determine, in essence, whether the claim of 
right supported by the national culture is a claim that warrants recogni-
tion as a matter of political-moral reasoning.71 
Defenders of the historical approach contend that it, unlike the 
other ways of determining the scope of substantive due process rights, 
significantly cabins the discretion of judges.72  Supporters of this ap-
proach contend that a “restrained methodology” which relies on the 
 
 68 Conkle, supra note 14, at 68. 
 69 Id. at 128. 
 70 Id. at 98 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 3–4, 11); see also supra notes 45–48 and ac-
companying text. 
 71 Conkle, supra note 14, at 98–99. 
 72 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting that the “effort to cabin the exercise of judicial discretion under the Due Process 
Clause by focusing its inquiry on those rights deeply rooted in American history and tra-
dition invites less opportunity for abuse than the alternatives”); Andrew T. Hyman, The 
Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 29 (2005) (“The obvious way for the Court to pre-
vent recurrent legislation from the bench would be by hewing to the objectivistic inter-
pretation of ‘due’ process that is supported by the historical record underlying the Bill of 
Rights, and is mandated by the very structure of the Constitution.”); Lund & McGinnis, 
supra note 3, at 1608 (praising the historical approach “because it does not collapse con-
stitutional law into a matter of mere political preference, undermining the judicial func-
tion”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2105 (2005) 
(“A decision to root substantive due process in traditions, narrowly understood, might be 
the best way of reducing judicial mistakes and judicial burdens . . . .”). 
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“guideposts” of history and tradition allows for the “rein[ing] in [of] 
the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process 
judicial review.”73  It is not clear, however, why historical assessments 
of which values qualify as proper normative bases for reviewing legis-
lation under substantive due process principles are necessarily more 
objective than the types of assessments called for by the other two ap-
proaches.  One only need look at the starkly different ways in which 
the Court used the history of sodomy regulations in Bowers v. Hard-
wick and Lawrence v. Texas to see that history, in fact, fails to provide 
objective guidance to judges.74 
The Hardwick Court viewed the history of sodomy statutes exclu-
sively through the prism of homosexuality, not once mentioning that 
those statutes traditionally did not make any distinctions based on the 
sex (or sexual orientation) of the parties.75  Without any explanation, 
the Court deemed that part of the historical record to be constitu-
tionally irrelevant.  The Court also conveniently ignored the seeming-
ly relevant historical fact that it was not until decades after the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted that some jurisdictions began to 
criminalize the particular sexual act (oral sex) that Michael Hardwick 
was arrested for,76 a fact that undermined its contention that the pro-
hibition of that conduct had “ancient roots.”77 
In contrast, the Lawrence Court viewed the historical record quite 
differently because it refused to view sodomy laws as representing 
long-standing and specific condemnations of same-sex sexual intima-
cy.78  Instead, the Court understood those laws to be part of a broader 
 
 73 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–22 (1997); see also id. at 720–21 (“[W]e have 
regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental 
rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi-
tion.’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 74 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 75 See CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM:  FIVE LGBT RIGHTS LAWSUITS 
THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION 207–08 (2010). 
 76 See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 165 (3d ed. 2008) (“[O]ral sex was not prohibited 
until states, at the end of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century, 
expanded the scope of their sodomy statutes.”); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, 
and Political Values:  Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1988) (“[I]n both 1791 and 1868 statutes proscribing ‘sodomy,’ ‘bug-
gery,’ and the ‘crime against nature,’ were interpreted to proscribe anal intercourse on-
ly—not fellatio, the act for which Hardwick was arrested.”). 
 77 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192. 
 78 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (“[I]t should be noted that there is no longstanding history in 
this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”); id. at 570 
(“[F]ar from possessing ‘ancient roots,’ American laws targeting same-sex couples did not 
develop until the last third of the 20th century.” (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192)). 
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regulatory regime aimed at nonprocreative sexual activity, one that 
applied regardless of the sex (or sexual orientation) of the parties in-
volved.79 
The subjectivity of the historical approach is only deepened by the 
analytical effect of a crucial antecedent question to its application, 
namely, what is the right that might be deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history?  For the Hardwick Court, the antecedent question (antece-
dent, that is, to the historical review) was whether there was a funda-
mental right to engage in a particular class of sexual acts (anal and 
oral sex) by a particular class of individuals (lesbians and gay men).80  
But as the Lawrence Court saw it, this was an inappropriately narrow 
way of framing the issue.81  For that Court, the crucial normative 
question was whether all individuals (regardless of sexual orienta-
tion) have a widely recognized liberty interest in choosing sexual 
partners without interference by the State.82 
Even assuming, then, that history teaches us “objective” lessons 
about which values are most important, what history teaches surely 
depends on the questions that we ask of it.  The historical record 
does not by itself tell us which questions to ask.  The amount of dis-
cretion that seems to accompany the framing of the issue in funda-
mental rights cases, including those in which judges follow the histor-
ical approach, belies the contention of the approach’s supporters 
that it is a significantly more objective way of proceeding than the al-
ternatives.83 
 
 79 Id. at 568 (“[E]arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but 
instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.”); id. at 570 
(“The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the [Hard-
wick] decision placed such reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of non-
procreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their 
homosexual character.”). 
 80 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 (“The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution con-
fers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . . .”); see also id. 
(“We . . . register our disagreement . . . that the Court’s prior cases have construed the 
Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 81 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (noting that the Hardwick Court “fail[ed] to appreciate the ex-
tent of the liberty at stake.  To say that the issue . . . was simply the right to engage in cer-
tain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would de-
mean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse.”). 
 82 Id. (noting that sodomy “statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is 
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals”). 
 83 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1613, 1615 (1990) (“[T]here are many different ways of describing a liberty, and 
many different ways of characterizing a tradition.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. 
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (ar-
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In short, the substantive due process analysis calls for a considera-
ble degree of judicial subjectivity regardless of a court’s analytical me-
thodology (that is, regardless of whether it emphasizes reasoned 
judgment, evolving values, or history and tradition).  It is precisely 
this subjectivity, as we have seen, which contributes in powerful ways 
to the perceived illegitimacy of liberty review.84  What is not usually 
recognized, however, is that equality review also requires judges to 
make crucial normative assessments, driven by the underlying moral 
and policy issues raised by the litigation, in establishing the appropri-
ate baseline with which to determine whether the legislation subject 
to challenge impermissibly violates equal protection principles.  It is 
to that issue that I turn to next. 
B.  Equality’s Dependence 
Almost thirty years ago, Professor Peter Westen published an ar-
ticle in the Harvard Law Review titled “The Empty Idea of Equality.”85  
The article, which sent shockwaves through some segments of the le-
gal academy, contended that the concept of equality—defined by 
Westen as the “proposition in law and morals that ‘people who are 
alike should be treated alike’ and its correlative, that ‘people who are 
unalike should be treated unalike’”—is normatively meaningless.86  
Westen explained that before we can determine whether individuals 
ought to be treated alike, we need to establish whether they are alike.87  
But since human beings have an almost infinite number of similari-
ties and differences, independent standards and rules are required to 
 
guing that “[t]he selection of a level of generality [in the fundamental rights analysis] 
necessarily involves value choices” and rejecting the notion, advanced by Justice Antonin 
Scalia, that choosing the lowest or most specific level of generality is a “value-neutral me-
thod”); see also John C. Toro, The Charade of Tradition-Based Substantive Due Process, 4 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIB. 172, 178 (2009) (“Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assurances, the [historical] 
test fails meaningfully to constrain judicial discretion.”). 
 84 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
 85 Westen, supra note 1.  Westen elaborated on his 1982 Harvard Law Review article in a 
book published eight years later.  See WESTEN, supra note 50.  When relevant, I explain in 
some of the notes that follow how Westen’s views on certain equality-related issues 
changed between the publishing of the article and the appearance of the book.  See infra 
notes 93, 103, and 192. 
 86 Westen, supra note 1, at 539–40 (footnote omitted). 
 87 As Westen explained it, 
[t]he formula “people who are alike should be treated alike” involves two compo-
nents:  (1) a determination that two people are alike; and (2) a moral judgment 
that they ought to be treated alike.  The determinative component is the first.  
Once one determines that two people are alike for purposes of the equality prin-
ciple, one knows how they ought to be treated. 
  Id. at 543. 
22 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
determine ex ante which similarities and differences are relevant giv-
en a particular moral or legal question.88 
It is the substantive component of those standards and rules, ra-
ther than the concept of equality itself, that determines whether any 
two individuals should be treated alike.  Westen explained that 
[j]ust as no categories of “like” people exist in nature, neither do catego-
ries of “like” treatment exist; treatments can be alike only in reference to 
some moral rule.  Thus, to say that people who are morally alike in a cer-
tain respect “should be treated alike” means that they should be treated 
in accord with the moral rule by which they are determined to be alike.  
Hence “likes should be treated alike” means that people for whom a cer-
tain treatment is prescribed by a standard should all be given the treat-
ment prescribed by the standard.  Or, more simply, people who by a rule 
should be treated alike should by the rule be treated alike.89 
In Westen’s view, equality is “an empty vessel with no substantive 
moral content of its own.  Without moral standards, equality remains 
meaningless, a formula that can have nothing to say about how we 
should act.  With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a 
formula that can do nothing but repeat what we already know.”90  As 
Westen saw it, equality is a derivative value, secondary to the standard 
or rule that specifies which similarities and differences are relevant. 
Statements of equality (or inequality) entail comparisons of two things or 
persons by reference to some external criterion that specifies the relevant 
respect in which they are the same or different.  To say that an apple is 
“like” or “equal to” an orange means that, despite their many differences, 
they each possess the feature or features that are relevant to an external 
criterion, whether those features be weight, surface area, or sugar con-
tent; to say that they are “unequal” means that they do not share the rele-
vant feature, whether it be color, taste, or juice content.  This analysis al-
so holds for ethical and legal statements of equality, the only difference 
being that, instead of testing the persons or things by a descriptive stan-
dard for determining which of them are the same, one tests them by a 
moral or legal standard for deciding which of them should be treated the 
same.  In each case, however, the comparison for purposes of equality 
 
 88 See id. at 544–47. 
 89 Id. at 546–47.  H.L.A. Hart made a similar point when he observed that 
though “Treat like cases alike and different cases differently” is a central element 
in the idea of justice, it is by itself incomplete and, until supplemented, cannot af-
ford any determinate guide to conduct.  This is so because any set of human be-
ings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from each other in oth-
ers and, until it is established what resemblances and differences are relevant, 
“Treat like cases alike” must remain an empty form.  To fill it we must know when, 
for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike and what differences 
are relevant. 
  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961). 
 90 Westen, supra note 1, at 547 (footnote omitted). 
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simply spells out what it means to have tested both subjects by the con-
trolling standard of relevance.91 
For Westen, to focus on equality when addressing moral and legal 
questions confuses matters because equality masquerades itself as an 
independent norm and thus hides the nature of the underlying subs-
tantive standards and rules that he believed should be the primary fo-
cus of moral and legal analyses.  In addition,  
because the proposition that likes should be treated alike is unquestion-
ably true, it gives an aura of revealed truth to whatever substantive values 
it happens to incorporate by reference.  As a consequence, values as-
serted in the form of equality tend to carry greater moral and legal 
weight than they deserve on their merits.92   
In Westen’s view, the distortions created by the incorporation of 
equality into moral and legal analyses outweigh the rhetorical bene-
fits gained from its deployment.93 
To come out against the concept of equality in the United States is 
akin to criticizing motherhood and apple pie.  Not surprisingly, 
therefore, it did not take long for other academics to take issue with 
many of the points that Westen made in his article.  For example, 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky criticized Westen for not distinguishing 
between insufficiency and unnecessariness—even if the concept of 
equality is insufficient to resolve legal and moral controversies, Che-
merinsky pointed out, that does not mean that it is also, as Westen 
contended, unnecessary.94 
Specifically, Chemerinsky complained that Westen failed to ap-
preciate the many ways in which equality is necessary:  It is morally 
necessary because it requires us to care about how people are treated 
in relation to one another; it is analytically necessary because it sup-
ports a presumption in favor of equal treatment, placing the burden 
on those who wish to make distinctions among groups or individuals; 
and it is “rhetorically necessary because it is a powerful symbol that 
 
 91 Id. at 552–53 (footnote omitted).  Westen added that “equality analysis logically collapses 
into rights analysis and . . . analyzing legal problems in terms of equality is essentially re-
dundant.”  Id. at 560. 
 92 Id. at 593 (footnote omitted). 
 93 Id. at 542.  In responding to some of the critics of his Harvard Law Review article, Westen 
explained that he agreed that equality has a “rhetorical force,” but he disagreed that it 
was a salutary one because “it comes not from focusing our attention on the considera-
tions that we believe should govern the resolution of normative disputes, but by conceal-
ing, obscuring, and confounding them.”  Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, 
Science, Math, and Morals:  A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 656–67 (1983).  A few years later, 
however, Westen conceded that the rhetorical value of equality could be significant.  See 
WESTEN, supra note 50, at 262–80. 
 94 Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality:  A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 
578–79 (1983). 
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helps to persuade decisionmakers to safeguard rights that otherwise 
would go unprotected.”95 
Professor Kenneth Karst also took exception to Westen’s conten-
tion that there is little of value in the concept of equality.  Drawing on 
the specifics of American history, including those related to religious 
dissent and racial subordination, Karst elaborated on the “emotional 
pull” of equality.96  He explained that  
[i]n American society the idea of equality means much more than the 
formal principle that likes should be treated alike.  The inequality that is 
on the defensive in America is the idea of caste, of rigid social hierarchy.  
When we see people trapped in a system that treats them as inferiors, our 
emotions are aroused.97   
Karst added that equality is also analytically useful because it “helps 
lawyers and judges to ask the right questions and reach the right solu-
tions.”98 
Although I agree with Chemerinsky and Karst on the analytical 
and rhetorical value of equality, they are not my main concern in this 
Article.  Instead, my interest here is in what I call “equality’s depen-
dence,” that is, in the way in which judgments that fall outside of ega-
litarian considerations must be incorporated into the analysis to give 
the concept of equality its normative bite.  Westen’s article is enligh-
tening in this regard because it is the most comprehensive and per-
suasive explanation of equality’s dependence in the legal literature. 
To further explain what I mean by “equality’s dependence,” it is 
helpful to draw on an essay by Professor Kent Greenawalt that was—
like Chemerinsky’s and Karst’s—quite critical of Westen’s article.  
Greenawalt took Westen to task for clinging to an unduly formalistic 
and narrow understanding of equality.  Arguing that the “idea of 
equality is much richer than [Westen] acknowledges[,]” Greenawalt 
pointed to what he called “substantive principles of equality” that go 
beyond the simple mantra that those who are alike ought to be 
treated alike.99 
Before turning to one (for our purposes) crucial substantive prin-
ciple of equality that Greenawalt discusses in his essay, it is important 
 
 95 Id. at 576 (emphasis omitted); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 1350, 1363–64 (1991) (noting, in a review of Professor Westen’s book, that 
“‘[E]quality’ is a useful term . . . , rebutting as it does from the outset any suggestion that 
what matters in politics is the ranking or differentiation of human knowledge and intelli-
gence.”). 
 96 Karst, supra note 15, at 250. 
 97 Id. at 251. 
 98 Id. at 250. 
 99 Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1983). 
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to note a key concession that Greenawalt makes regarding Westen’s 
elaboration of what I am calling “equality’s dependence.”  “Westen 
powerfully reminds us,” Greenawalt wrote, “of a point often made, 
rarely challenged directly, but often forgotten:  namely, that in the 
absence of substantive criteria indicating which people are equal for 
particular purposes and what constitutes equal treatment, the formal 
principle of equality provides no guidance for how people should be 
treated.”100 
In this sentence, Greenawalt acknowledges the notion of equali-
ty’s dependence, at least as it applies to formal equality.  The reason 
why equality’s dependency is, as Greenawalt puts it, “often forgot-
ten”—and I think this is where there is a kernel of truth behind Wes-
ten’s skepticism about the normative force of equality—is that we of-
ten get so caught up in the seemingly firm moral demands of 
equality, that we fail to recognize that it is not a “free-standing” con-
cept, that is, one that is independent of antecedent normative judg-
ments.101  In emphasizing this point, my objective is not, as it appears 
to have been Professor Westen’s, to push equality off of its normative 
perch; instead, it is to emphasize that equality’s normative bite is de-
pendent on other (nonegalitarian) values and judgments.102 
Equality’s dependence is not limited to formal equality principles; 
instead, that dependency is also present in more substantive equality 
norms that go beyond the idea that those who are alike should be 
treated alike.  In his essay, Greenawalt discusses one of those norms, 
namely, that certain characteristics (such as race and ethnic origin) 
should be deemed irrelevant for purposes of distributing rights and 
benefits. 
 
100 Id. at 1169; see also Waldron, supra note 95, at 1352 (noting that “Westen’s argument that 
we should always look below the surface of ‘equality’ rhetoric to the substantial claims of 
principle that are doing the real work in moral and political debate . . . is an important 
argument . . . that . . . helps to clarify much of what is going on in the modern discussion 
of discrimination”). 
101 See Larry Alexander & Larry Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 739, 755 
(1997) (“If ‘equality’ is a value, it is not a free-standing one.”). 
102 See Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 85 (1996) (“One does not ab-
andon correct moral principles to honor the demands of equality.  Rather, one must re-
fer to correct moral principles to know what equality demands.”); Brown, supra note 1, at 
1495 (“Unanchored to a source of substantive values, a call for equality does not necessar-
ily guarantee any particular freedoms or opportunities.” (footnote omitted)); Cheme-
rinsky, supra note 94, at 578–79 (“[E]quality depends on other concepts to decide which 
differences to strike down and which to uphold.”); Karst, supra note 15, at 249–50 (“The 
ideal [of equality] . . . has [a] substantive content; it is a cluster of substantive values, with 
moral underpinnings solidly based in a particular society’s religious and philosophical 
traditions.” (footnote omitted)); Simons, supra note 50, at 482 (“The idea of equality is a 
lens through which we project fundamental social visions.”). 
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Oddly, Westen in his article rejects the notion that nondiscrimina-
tion norms of this kind are egalitarian in nature.103  But Greenawalt 
persuasively argues that 
[i]f it is a claim of equality that people similarly subject to an established 
standard should be treated the same way (Westen’s version of the formal 
principle of equality), surely claims that people should be treated the 
same way with regard to one or many benefits or burdens because they 
share relevant characteristics, and claims that people should not be de-
nied the same treatment on the basis of irrelevant differences (such as 
race or gender), are also claims of equality.104 
In my view, Greenawalt is undoubtedly correct that nondiscrimi-
nation norms are properly labeled ones of equality, but the important 
point for our purposes is not the lexical one of how to categorize cer-
tain norms (e.g., as egalitarian or not); instead, the crucial point is 
that the nondiscrimination norm, like that of formal equality, de-
pends on prior judgments regarding the moral (ir)relevance of the 
characteristics at issue. 
Another way of explaining this is that if we return to Greenawalt’s 
excerpt quoted above, the crucial judgment in determining whether 
a particular set of individuals should be protected by the norm of 
nondiscrimination is whether they “share relevant characteristics” 
given the benefit or burden that is subject to distribution.  The cru-
cial point to keep in mind is that that assessment is antecedent to the 
question of whether the egalitarian norm of nondiscrimination ap-
plies. 
So, for example, before we can conclude that race should not be 
taken into account in the distribution of benefits and burdens, we 
need to reach a moral judgment that racial differences are irrelevant 
 
103 Westen explained his position as follows:   
It would be a mistake . . . to think that . . . notions of racial justice have anything in 
particular to do with the idea that likes should be treated alike.  They are inde-
pendent rights, identical in their logic to first amendment rights of speech and re-
ligion.  Like rights of speech and religion, rights of race and sex can be stated 
without reference to “likes” or “equals.”   
  Westen, supra note 1, at 565.  In his later work, Westen modified his view on this point, 
acknowledging that “antidiscrimination rights are commonly, and appropriately, referred 
to as ‘equality rights.’”  WESTEN, supra note 50, at 134.  Westen elaborated on his new po-
sition as follows: 
[A]lthough all rights result in equality, and all such equalities possess the same ba-
sic features, antidiscrimination rights are designed to achieve equality in ways that 
other rights are not, because unlike other rights, which require single and speci-
fied relationships of equality, antidiscrimination rights aim toward, and are satis-
fied by, any relationship of equality between rightsholders and the persons of 
whose treatment their rights are a function. 
  Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 Greenawalt, supra note 99, at 1180 (footnote omitted). 
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for most or all purposes.  More specifically, it is only after we reach 
the judgment that race, for example, does not impact the abilities, 
character, or potential of human beings that we then proceed, as a 
matter of morality and law, to discourage the use of race in the distri-
bution of benefits and burdens. 
The same analytical framework applies to sexual orientation.  The 
crucial judgment that must be made when addressing gay rights is-
sues from a nondiscrimination perspective is whether those with a 
same-sex sexual orientation differ in abilities, character, or potential 
from those with a different-sex sexual orientation (who presumably 
have greater access to the benefit, or suffer less from the burden, in 
question).  And to make that judgment, we must grapple with compli-
cated normative questions regarding human sexuality and intimate 
relationships.105 
Take, for example, the issue of same-sex relationships and their 
legal recognition.  It may seem at first glance that the question of 
whether the State should treat same-sex relationships in the same way 
that it treats different-sex ones is primarily (or even entirely) one of 
equality.  But before we can establish what equality demands, we must 
first determine whether it applies.  And in answering that antecedent 
question, we must look outside of equality considerations.  In the 
specific context of the legal recognition of intimate relationships, we 
need to determine the relevant characteristics for deciding whether 
same-sex relationships are sufficiently similar to their heterosexual 
counterparts so as to render appropriate the application of equality 
principles.106 
There will be disagreements, of course, on which characteristics 
should be deemed relevant.  Some may argue that it is the degree of 
commitment among gay couples that should matter, while others may 
point to their willingness to abide by monogamy precepts while yet 
others may emphasize parenting attributes.  (And some may want to 
emphasize all—or none of—these factors.)  But the key point is that 
the choice of the relevant criteria is not driven by egalitarian consid-
 
105 Shannon Minter has expressed a similar view, noting that 
[i]n the context of gay rights, courts and others must make normative judg-
ments . . . about whether sexual orientation is a permissible basis for unequal 
treatment . . . . To make those substantive determinations, courts and legislators, 
as well as voters, ultimately must rely on substantive norms.  There is no shortcut 
around those normative judgments based on purportedly neutral principles, self-
evident facts or . . . a purely procedural account of fairness. 
  Minter, supra note 6, at 115–16 (footnote omitted). 
106 I return to this issue below in exploring how courts have applied equality principles in 
determining the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.  See infra notes 167–99 and 
accompanying text. 
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erations.  Those considerations come into the analysis only if and 
when we are persuaded that there are no relevant differences be-
tween gay and straight couples for purposes of state recognition of 
sexually intimate relationships.  Equality considerations do not help 
us determine which similarities (or differences) are relevant. 
In short, to reach the normative conclusion that lesbians and gay 
men ought to be treated like heterosexuals (or to put it differently, 
that sexual orientation should be an irrelevant criterion in the distri-
bution of particular benefits and burdens), we need to make antece-
dent normative assessments that fall outside of equality’s domain. 
Equality’s dependence belies the notion that equality is a more 
“self-contained” constitutional norm than liberty, that is, a norm that 
allows judges to decide cases without bringing to bear their normative 
assessments regarding disputed moral and policy issues.  As I noted in 
the Introduction, it seems to be widely assumed that substantive due 
process doctrine encourages (or allows) judges to rely on their per-
sonal values in ways that equality principles do not.107  It is thought, in 
other words, that the norm of equality constrains judges’ discretion 
in ways that the norm of liberty does not.  I do not believe that this is 
the case.  In the next section, I provide specific examples of the simi-
lar normative judgments that courts have reached while engaging in 
both liberty and equality reviews of gay rights claims to support my 
view. 
II.  NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS IN GAY RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
It is in some ways not surprising that equality review is thought to 
be more neutral (or less normatively substantive) than liberty review.  
The latter, after all, has revolved around the notion of fundamental 
rights, that is, of those rights that (however defined and determined) 
represent historical (or evolving or enduring) values that serve as a 
normative baseline through which to assess the constitutionality of 
legislation that impacts on considerations of privacy and autonomy.108  
In contrast, equal protection review is thought to avoid similar value 
choices because the crucial issue in equality cases is not whether the 
government can regulate in a certain area but how it does so.109  This 
 
107 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
108 See generally Conkle, supra note 14. 
109 See Minter, supra note 6, at 106 (“Deeming certain rights ‘fundamental’ in effect says to 
the people or the legislature, ‘You may not go beyond these substantive boundaries.’  In 
contrast, the principle of equal protection says, ‘You may set the boundaries where you 
like, but you must set them equally for everyone.’” (footnote omitted)). 
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analytical framework provides equality review with an aura of proce-
duralism that immunizes it against some of the strongest and fiercest 
criticisms aimed at liberty review. 
That aura of proceduralism has only been made brighter by John 
Hart Ely’s widely discussed ideas regarding how judicial review can be 
understood in ways that are consistent with democratic theory.  Ely’s 
key contribution was to conceive of judicial review, properly unders-
tood, as interested not in “the substantive merits” for or against the 
challenged legislation but in “questions of participation,” that is, in 
the extent to which the courts are confident that legislators ac-
counted for the interests of all citizens in enacting the legislation in 
question.110 
Ely believed that the Equal Protection Clause was particularly well 
suited for this type of procedural and representation-reinforcing un-
derstanding of judicial review.111  As Professor Jane Schacter puts it, 
“Ely’s theory of ‘representation reinforcement’. . . . has been offered 
as an appealing way to operationalize equal protection guarantees 
without dragging courts into endlessly contested debates about subs-
tantive values and ideas.”112  What Ely failed to account for, however, 
 
110 ELY, supra note 12, at 181.  Ely elaborated on this point as follows: 
[C]ontrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as “an enduring 
but evolving statement of general values,” . . . the selection and accommodation of 
substantive values is left almost entirely to the political process and instead the 
document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fair-
ness in the resolution of individual disputes (process writ small), and on the other, 
with what might capaciously be designated process writ large—with ensuring 
broad participation in the processes and distributions of government. 
  Id. at 87 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 100–01 (“The general strategy has . . . not been 
to root in the document a set of substantive rights entitled to permanent protection.  The 
Constitution has instead proceeded from the quite reasonable assumption that an effec-
tive majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that 
such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself . . . .”). 
111 Id. at 82 (arguing that the “Equal Protection Clause is obviously our Constitution’s most 
dramatic embodiment of th[e] ideal” that elected officials should represent the interests 
of the entire community and not only of a few).  Professor Jane Schacter has summarized 
Ely’s understanding of the role of equal protection in achieving the objectives of judicial 
review as follows: 
Ely recast constitutional equality protections as consistent—not in tension—with 
democracy by identifying inequality born of social “prejudice” as democracy’s ne-
mesis.  Positing that “prejudice is a lens that distorts reality,” Ely enlisted judges in 
the enterprise of political process perfection—that is, in self-consciously correcting 
for the ways that prejudice compromises the democratic process . . . . Seen in these 
terms, equality-enhancing judicial review enables democracy rather than applies a 
brake on it. 
  Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 390–91 
(1997) (footnotes omitted). 
112 Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar:  Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage De-
bate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2011).  Professor Schacter adds that  
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was the extent to which the application of the principle of equality is 
itself dependent on the types of substantive normative judgments that 
he thought was best to keep outside of judicial review’s domain.113 
Now that we have an idea, from the previous section, of what 
equality’s dependence is all about, we can turn our attention to spe-
cific examples, in the context of gay rights constitutional litigation, of 
the similar ways in which judges rely on normative assessments to de-
cide both liberty and equality claims.  My objective here is not just to 
show that both liberty and equality review call for the making of 
normative judgments; instead, my aim is to also illustrate how the na-
ture of those judgments in the two categories of cases is quite similar. 
A.  Gay Rights Liberty Cases 
Over the last few decades, the most persistent question related to 
the liberty rights of gay people under the Constitution has arisen in 
the context of the State’s authority to criminalize consensual same-
sex sexual intimacy.  For that reason, I begin below with an explora-
tion of how different Supreme Court Justices have normatively 
tackled that question at different times.  I then proceed to consider 
the types of normative judgments that judges have made in determin-
ing whether same-sex marriage bans are consistent with considera-
tions of constitutional liberty. 
 
Ely was animated by a desire to avoid constitutional rules that placed judges in 
what he regarded as the democratically dangerous position of making contested 
choices based on the open-textured language in the Constitution.  Thus, he of-
fered up his principles as matters of neutral process that could be employed with-
out the need to adjudicate controversial normative debates.   
  Id. at 1371. 
113 Several commentators, in critiquing Ely’s process theory of constitutional law, have noted 
the extent to which the Constitution inescapably calls for the application of substantive 
values.  See Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics, The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 
77 VA. L. REV. 721, 722 (1991) (“At some level in any constitutional theory, the substan-
tive judgments Ely purports to eschew must enter into the analysis.”); Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) 
(“The process theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are 
specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and val-
ues—the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid.”) (I discuss 
Tribe’s critique of process-based theories of constitutional law in infra notes 214–21 and 
accompanying text.); see also Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 131 
(1981) (“[M]ost instances of representation-reinforcing review demand value judgments 
not different in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort.”). 
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1.  Sodomy Cases 
Although contemporary substantive due process rights are usually 
traced back to a couple of parenting cases from the 1920s,114 the con-
stitutional right to privacy and personal autonomy in matters related 
to sexual intimacy was first articulated by Justice John Harlan in his 
1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman.115  At issue in Poe was the constitutionali-
ty of a Connecticut statute that criminalized the use of contracep-
tives.116  The Court refused to reach the merits of the case on the 
ground that, since it was unlikely that the statute would be enforced 
against the plaintiffs, which included a married couple,117 the lawsuit 
did not raise a justiciable controversy.118  Justice Harlan, after disa-
greeing with the Court on the justiciability issue, proceeded to ad-
dress the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, one grounded 
in substantive due process.119 
In concluding that the statute was unconstitutional, Harlan em-
phasized two points.  The first was the degree of governmental intru-
sion into the intimate decisions of couples—including married 
ones—that was required in order to successfully investigate and pros-
ecute the crime.  The enforcement of the contraception statute, Har-
lan noted, “is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in 
the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual’s personal 
life.”120 
Harlan’s second concern was that the statute intruded into the 
home, a site that he believed was protected not only by the Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, but al-
so by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Liberty Clause.  As Harlan put it, 
“the enactment involves what, by common understanding throughout 
the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamen-
tal aspect of ‘liberty,’ the privacy of the home in its most basic sense, 
 
114 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law requiring children to 
attend public schools based on parents’ liberty right to make important decisions about 
their welfare); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a law prohibiting 
teaching foreign languages to children based on parents’ liberty right to control their 
education). 
115 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
116 Also at issue in the case was a second statute that prohibited the giving of medical advice 
about the use of contraceptives.  Id. at 498. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 507–08. 
119 Id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 539. 
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and it is this which requires that the statute be subjected to ‘strict 
scrutiny.’”121 
Notice that both of Harlan’s concerns about the contraception 
law could have been used to question the constitutionality of sodomy 
statutes, which, at the time the Poe lawsuit was brought, were in place 
in every state of the union.122  None of those statutes made distinc-
tions based on either the marital status or gender of the parties.123  
What they did do was authorize the State to bring to bear its investi-
gatory and prosecutorial powers on the intimate relationships of indi-
viduals, including married couples.  Sodomy laws were, in this sense, 
no different from the contraception statute at issue in Poe.  In addi-
tion, it is reasonable to believe that sodomy statutes were most fre-
quently violated in private homes, the site that, according to Harlan, 
was entitled to special constitutional protection.124 
Despite the fact that sodomy statutes raised constitutional con-
cerns that were similar to those raised by Connecticut’s contraception 
statute, Harlan left little doubt that his understanding of constitu-
tional liberty did not immunize consensual same-sex sexual conduct 
from criminal prosecution, even when such conduct took place in the 
otherwise constitutionally privileged site of the home.125  Harlan did 
not explain why he believed that consensual gay sex was different 
from heterosexual sex by married couples, except to make the de-
scriptive observation that society’s legal rules and moral norms dis-
couraged the former and encouraged the latter.126  But Harlan did 
feel it necessary to explain that “not to discriminate between what is in-
volved in this case and . . . the traditional offenses against good mor-
 
121 Id. at 548 (citation omitted). 
122 Illinois in 1961 became the first state to repeal its sodomy statute.  BALL, supra note 75, at 
208. 
123 See id. 
124 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
125 Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I would not suggest that adultery, homosex-
uality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately prac-
ticed.”). 
126 Harlan explained that, 
[t]he laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be 
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought 
up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices 
which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful mar-
riage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that 
any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis. 
Id. at 546 (citation omitted); see also id. at 553 (“Adultery, homosexuality and the like are 
sexual intimacies which the State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and 
wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an in-
stitution which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fos-
tered and protected.”). 
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als or crimes [including homosexuality] which . . . may . . . happen to 
have been committed or concealed in the home, would entirely mis-
conceive the argument that is being made.”127 
The Supreme Court, of course, eventually disagreed with Harlan’s 
position on the constitutionality of sodomy statutes,128 but for our 
present purposes what is important is that Harlan believed that the 
sexual orientation of individuals was a relevant consideration in de-
termining the scope and applicability of the Liberty Clause in matters 
related to sexual intimacy. 
Although Harlan did not elaborate on his view regarding the rele-
vancy of sexual orientation for substantive due process purposes, the 
same cannot be said of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.129  In the twenty-five years between Poe and Hardwick, the 
Supreme Court struck down the same Connecticut statute at issue in 
the former case as applied to married couples,130 held that unmarried 
couples have a constitutional right to use contraceptives,131 and con-
stitutionally protected a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnan-
cy.132  But according to the Hardwick Court, whatever constitutional 
protection applied to the choices of heterosexuals in exercising their 
sexuality, it was unavailable to lesbians and gay men.133 
It is clear, for several reasons, that the Hardwick Court found the 
sexual orientation of individuals to be constitutionally relevant when 
interpreting the meaning of the Liberty Clause.  First, even though 
the Georgia statute at issue did not distinguish between same-sex and 
different-sex sodomy,134 the Court viewed the case exclusively through 
the prism of homosexuality without once addressing how the statute 
might impact heterosexuals.  Second, as noted earlier, the Court 
framed the issue narrowly by asking whether one category of individ-
uals (i.e., gay people) have a fundamental right to engage in particu-
lar sexual acts rather than by inquiring whether all individuals, re-
gardless of sexual orientation, have the right to make decisions 
related to sexual intimacy without state interference.135  And finally, 
 
127 Id. at 553 (emphasis added). 
128 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
129 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
130 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
131 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
132 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
133 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (claiming that a fundamental right to en-
gage in gay sex “is, at best, facetious”). 
134 Id. at 188 n.1. 
135 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  Professor Laurence Tribe has noted that 
“Georgia’s brief . . . encouraged the Court’s recasting of the right at issue, denouncing 
34 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
while the Court viewed heterosexuals as individuals who marry, form 
families, and procreate, it saw gay people as defined solely through 
their interest in engaging in sodomous acts.136  As the Court put it, 
“we think it evident that none of the rights announced in [the 
Court’s prior substantive due process cases] bears any resemblance to 
the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of 
sodomy that is asserted in this case.”137 
In sharp contrast, Justice Harry Blackmun in his dissent con-
cluded that the sexual orientation of Michael Hardwick—the gay 
man arrested in his Atlanta apartment for having consensual sex with 
another man138—was wholly irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.  
Blackmun criticized the majority for “its almost obsessive focus on 
homosexual activity.”139  After noting that the sodomy statute in ques-
tion applied to everyone regardless of sexual orientation, Blackmun 
explained that “[u]nlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not 
proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from 
other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that would 
not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens.”140 
As Blackmun saw it, the Georgia sodomy statute violated the Li-
berty Clause because it interfered with the ability of all individuals—
regardless of sexual orientation—to define themselves in important 
ways through their choices regarding sexually intimate relation-
ships.141  “In a Nation as diverse as ours,” Blackmun explained, “there 
may be many ‘right’ ways of conducting those relationships, 
and . . . much of the richness of a relationship will come from the 
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these in-
tensely personal bonds.”142  From Blackmun’s perspective, Hardwick’s 
 
homosexual sodomy as ‘purely an unnatural means of satisfying an unnatural lust.’”  
Tribe, supra note 34, at 1900–01 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 27, Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85–140), 1985 WL 667939). 
136 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191 (concluding that there was “[n]o connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other”). 
137 Id. at 190–91.  The Lawrence Court castigated the Hardwick majority for its unduly narrow 
view of gay people:  “To say that the issue in [Hardwick] was simply the right to engage in 
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would de-
mean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
138 On the events leading up to Hardwick’s arrest, see BALL, supra note 75, at 12–13. 
139 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
140 Id. (citation omitted). 
141 Id. at 205 (“[S]exual intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central 
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personali-
ty . . . . [I]ndividuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual 
relationships . . . .”) (citations omitted)). 
142 Id. (citations omitted). 
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constitutional claim involving his rights of privacy and autonomy 
were “not depend[ent] in any way on his sexual orientation.”143 
Seventeen years after Hardwick, the Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. 
Texas,144 came around to adopting Justice Blackmun’s view that a 
claimant’s same-sex sexual orientation should be irrelevant in deter-
mining the scope and applicability of the Liberty Clause.  For the 
Hardwick majority, the decision to engage in gay sexual intimacy was 
constitutionally unprotected even if the conduct took place within 
the private confines of the home.145  But for the Lawrence Court, the 
sexual orientation of adults who choose to have sexual relationships 
in private was irrelevant.  What now mattered constitutionally was that 
sodomy statutes “touch . . . upon the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.  The 
statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within 
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as crimi-
nals.”146 
Rather than focusing on the parties’ sexual orientation, the Law-
rence Court focused on the autonomy- and dignity-based interests that 
all individuals share when making the exceedingly personal decision 
of choosing sexual partners.147  Indeed, the Lawrence Court, unlike the 
Hardwick Court, drew a normative connection between same-sex sex-
ual conduct and the committed relationships that can accompany it.  
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lawrence, recog-
nized that the criminalization of particular kinds of sexual intimacy 
not only limits the ability of individuals to decide which kinds of sex-
ual acts to engage in and with whom; it also restricts their ability to 
build relationships that are based, in part, upon that sexual intima-
cy.148  Thus, Kennedy noted that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expres-
sion in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but 
 
143 Id. at 201; see also id. at 206 (“The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to 
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really 
has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the 
nature of their intimate associations with others.”). 
144 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
145 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194–96. 
146 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
147 The rights protected by the Liberty Clause, the Court explained, “involv[e] the most in-
timate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy . . . . Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Id. at 574 (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).  The Court 
then added that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
148 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
36 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”149  In short, 
while the Hardwick Court was unwilling to see gay people as more 
than the sum total of their interests in engaging in particular sexual 
acts, the Lawrence Court saw gay people as fuller human beings.150 
We are not here interested in whether the Hardwick Court and 
Justice Harlan in his Poe dissent on the one hand or the Lawrence 
Court and Justice Blackmun in his Hardwick dissent on the other had 
the better arguments regarding the proper understanding of substan-
tive due process in matters related to sexual conduct.  Instead, our 
interest is in the crucial role that the Justices’ normative assessments 
regarding the (ir)relevancy of sexual orientation for purposes of de-
termining the scope of liberty rights, and regarding the connection 
between having a same-sex sexuality and the ability to enter into im-
portant and dignity-conferring relationships, played in their respec-
tive interpretations of the proper scope of the Liberty Clause. 
It can be argued that it is precisely these types of normative as-
sessments that help make the doctrine of substantive due process so 
problematic.  This is because it may seem that judges, in determining 
the meaning of the Liberty Clause, bring to bear their personal views 
about the very moral and policy issues that are in play when the State 
considers whether to criminalize consensual sodomy.  Indeed, none 
of the four decisions discussed in this section—the majority opinions 
in Hardwick and Lawrence, as well as Harlan’s dissent in Poe and 
Blackmun’s in Hardwick—pointed to any specific evidence (in the 
record or otherwise) to support or justify their normative assessments 
regarding the relevancy of sexual orientation in determining the 
scope of the State’s constitutional authority to criminalize consensual 
sexual conduct.  This may suggest that those assessments were in 
some sense “extra-judicial,” that is, based on the judges’ personal 
views—perhaps grounded in their general knowledge about (ho-
mo)sexuality as well as in their particular knowledge (or lack thereof) 
of specific gay people—about sexual orientation. 
As I will attempt to show in Part II.B, however, judges deciding gay 
rights cases under equal protection principles reach similar norma-
tive assessments, sometimes in the same seemingly “extra-judicial” 
manner.151  This suggests that there may be nothing particularly 
unique or troubling about the kinds of normative assessments that 
 
149 Id. 
150 I further explore the way in which the Lawrence Court understood gay people and their 
relationships in Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry:  Same-Sex Mar-
riage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1212–15 (2004). 
151 See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
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judges make while engaging in liberty review.  But before grappling 
with questions of equality, it is helpful to first explore how courts 
have assessed the constitutionality of another crucial gay rights issue, 
that of same-sex marriage bans, under liberty principles. 
2.  Same-Sex Marriage 
Like sodomy statutes, same-sex marriage bans have been chal-
lenged on substantive due process grounds.152  The threshold ques-
tion in these cases, as in the sodomy ones, has been how to define the 
fundamental right that may be at issue.  The plaintiffs in the marriage 
cases have argued that the fundamental right to marry is broad 
enough to include same-sex couples.153  In particular, they have 
claimed that the right, at its core, is about protecting the interests of 
all individuals to choose the person whom they want to marry.154  For 
their part, the states have contended that while there is a fundamen-
tal right to marry,155 it is not available to same-sex couples.156 
In order for courts to decide whether same-sex couples enjoy a 
constitutional right to marry, they must first make normative assess-
ments about what are the principal purposes of marriage.157  If those 
purposes are correlated in some appreciable ways to the uniqueness 
of heterosexual unions (however that uniqueness is defined), then it 
makes sense to understand the fundamental right at issue not as a 
general right of everyone (regardless of sexual orientation) to marry 
 
152 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
153 See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007) (“Appellees argue that we 
should not be concerned with whether the Court should recognize a new fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage, but instead should focus on whether the existing fundamental 
right to marriage should be extended to include same-sex couples.”). 
154 See, e.g., Lewis, 908 A.2d at 206 (“Plaintiffs contend that the right to marry a person of the 
same sex is a fundamental right [and] . . . . that the liberty interest at stake is ‘the right of 
every adult to choose whom to marry without intervention of government.’”); Andersen v. 
King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 976 (Wash. 2006) (“Plaintiffs maintain they have the funda-
mental right to marry the person of their choice.”). 
155 The most important Supreme Court cases on the fundamental right to marry are Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating regulation prohibiting prisoners from marry-
ing), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down antimiscegenation statute 
on equal protection and due process grounds).  The Court also discussed the fundamen-
tal right to marry in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), but it decided that case—
which involved a statute prohibiting individuals who owed child support from marrying—
on equal protection, rather than on substantive due process, grounds. 
156 See, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976 (“While the State agrees that marriage is a fundamental 
right, it says that it does not include same-sex marriage.”). 
157 See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
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the person of their choice but instead as the right of heterosexuals to 
have their (unique) relationships validated and supported through 
the institution of marriage. 
It can be argued that when courts conclude that same-sex couples 
do not enjoy a fundamental right to marry because the right to marry 
is limited to heterosexual couples, they engage in conclusory reason-
ing.  But the reasoning is not conclusory if it is accompanied by nor-
mative assessments regarding the principal purposes of marriages.  If 
those assessments lead courts to conclude, for example, that the 
principal purposes of marriage are to promote procreation and to 
encourage the raising of children by dual-gender couples, then an 
understanding of the fundamental right to marry as limited to differ-
ent-sex couples is a defensible position to take.  It is noteworthy in 
this regard that some state supreme courts, in rejecting the idea that 
the fundamental right to marry applies to same-sex couples, have  
pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court has only spoken of the 
right to marry in cases involving different-sex couples.158 
A key normative assessment that is part of the constitutional analy-
sis of same-sex marriage bans under liberty review (as it is under 
equality review, as we will see in the next section),159 then, is a deter-
mination of what are the essential purposes of marriage.  It is no 
coincidence that the California Supreme Court, the only appellate 
court which has held that the fundamental right to marry (in this 
case, under the state constitution) is sufficiently capacious to include 
same-sex couples, is also the only appellate court that, as part of its 
liberty analysis, has explicitly concluded that marriage is not primarily 
 
158 See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 619 (noting that all of the Supreme Court’s marriage “cases 
infer that the right to marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature 
of the relationship and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of our species”); 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 14 (N.Y. 2006) (“While many U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions recognize marriage as a fundamental right protected under the Due Process 
Clause, all of these cases understood the marriage right as involving a union of one wom-
an and one man.” (citations omitted)).  Several courts have also concluded that the ab-
sence of same-sex marriages in American history means that lesbian and gay couples do 
not have a constitutional right to marry.  See, e.g.,  Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cn-
ty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“[S]ame-sex marriages are nei-
ther deeply rooted in the legal and social history of our Nation or state nor are they im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 208, 211 (noting that “the 
liberty interest at stake is not some undifferentiated, abstract right to marriage, but rather 
the right of people of the same sex to marry,” and then concluding that “a right to same-
sex marriage is [not] so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the 
people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 978 (not-
ing that there is not “a tradition or history of same-sex marriage in this state”). 
159 See infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text. 
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about procreation and dual-gender parenting.160  Instead, the court in 
In Re Marriage Cases161 ruled that the core purpose of marriage is to 
provide public recognition of the life-long commitment that individ-
uals choose to make with another as part of an intimate relationship.  
As the court put it, “the right to marry represents the right of an indi-
vidual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one’s 
choice, and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society 
and to the individual.”162 
But the California court’s liberty analysis in In re Marriage Cases did 
not (and could not) end with the making of a normative judgment 
about the principal purpose of marriage.  This is because it still had 
to grapple with the (again) normative question of whether sexual 
orientation was relevant to the scope and applicability of the funda-
mental right to marry.  That is, once the court concluded that the 
principal purpose of marriage is to provide social support for the de-
 
160 Other appellate courts have reached similar conclusions, but they have done so as part of 
their equality (as opposed to liberty) review of same-sex marriage bans.  See Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424–25 n.19 (Conn. 2008) (“[E]ven though pro-
creative conduct plays an important role in many marriages, we do not believe that such 
conduct so defines the institution of marriage that the inability to engage in that conduct 
is determinative of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for 
equal protection purposes . . . .”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) 
(“[O]ur marriage laws are rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for 
defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized 
society . . . . [They] also serve to recognize the status of the parties’ committed relation-
ship.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
161 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  A few months after the California high court issued its opinion, 
state voters approved Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment banning same-sex mar-
riages.  The following year, the same court upheld that amendment on state constitution-
al grounds.  See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).  But a year after that, a federal 
district court struck down Proposition 8 on federal constitutional grounds.  Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
162 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 423 (footnote omitted).  The California Supreme Court’s 
opinion in In Re Marriage Cases is particularly helpful for our purposes because it distin-
guished the due process analysis from the equality one.  In contrast, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 
(Mass. 2003), which also struck down the state’s same-sex marriage ban, is less helpful for 
our purposes because it provided a unitary analysis—that is, one that did not separate li-
berty considerations from equality ones—after concluding that the liberty and equality 
concerns raised by the ban overlapped.  See id. at 953 (“In matters implicating marriage, 
family life, and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional concepts [of liberty and 
equality] frequently overlap, as they do here.”).  It bears noting, however, that the Massa-
chusetts court, like the California one, staked out a clearly normative position on the cen-
tral purpose of marriage.  As the Massachusetts court saw it, “it is the exclusive and per-
manent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of 
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.”  Id. at 961 (footnote omitted); see also 
id. at 955 (“Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that ex-
press our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision 
whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”). 
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cision of an individual to enter into a committed and loving relation-
ship with another, it then had to determine whether gay people in 
particular are capable of entering and remaining in those relation-
ships.  The California court answered that key question in the affir-
mative after concluding that “[t]he capability of gay individuals to en-
ter into loving and enduring relationships [is] comparable to those 
entered into by heterosexuals.”163  The court added that “an individu-
al’s homosexual orientation is not a constitutionally legitimate basis 
for withholding or restricting the individual’s legal rights.”164  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court embraced the normative view that 
“homosexuality [is] simply one of the numerous variables of our 
common and diverse humanity.”165 
We are not here interested in the merits of the California court’s 
normative assessments.  Instead, we are interested in the nature of 
those assessments in order to compare them with the types of judg-
ments that courts make in gay rights constitutional cases when engag-
ing in equality review.  As we will see in the next section, there are 
significant similarities between the two. 
B.  Gay Rights Equality Cases 
My discussion so far of how judges rely on normative assessments 
in determining the scope and applicability of the Liberty Clause in 
gay rights cases might seem to support the view that substantive due 
process is a less legitimate basis for striking down legislation than are 
principles of equality.  After all, as we have seen, a critical part of the 
constitutional analysis in those cases is predicated on judges’ norma-
tive assessments of questions such as the relevancy of sexual orienta-
tion in public policy matters, the purpose of the institution of mar-
riage, and the capabilities of gay people to form committed 
 
163 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 428.  It is worth noting that the California court in In re 
Marriage Cases relied heavily on the actions of the legislature—including its enactment of 
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws and of a comprehensive domestic partnership 
law—to reach its normative conclusion about the relationship-related capabilities of les-
bians and gay men.  As the court explained, 
[t]his state’s current policies and conduct regarding homosexuality recognize that 
gay individuals are entitled to the same legal rights and the same respect and dig-
nity afforded all other individuals and are protected from discrimination on the 
basis of their sexual orientation, and, more specifically, recognize that gay individ-
uals are fully capable of entering into the kind of loving and enduring committed 
relationships that may serve as the foundation of a family and of responsibly caring 
for and raising children. 
  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
164 Id. at 429 (citations omitted). 
165 Id. at 428. 
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relationships.  However, as I explain in this section of the Article, 
which discusses same-sex marriage (from an equality perspective) and 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Romer v. Evans,166 equality review in 
gay rights cases requires judges to make similar normative assess-
ments. 
1.  Same-Sex Marriage 
Most of the state supreme courts that have struck down same-sex 
marriage bans have done so not on the basis of substantive due 
process but on that of equality.167  In doing so, they have made nor-
mative assessments that are strikingly similar to those reached by the 
California court in In re Marriage Cases when it determined the validity 
of same-sex marriage bans through the lens of constitutional liberty. 
In the Connecticut same-sex marriage litigation, for example, the 
government took the position that the state constitution’s equal pro-
tection provision could not grant relief to the plaintiffs because same-
sex couples and different-sex ones are not similarly situated.  Specifi-
cally, the government contended that “the conduct that the[] [plain-
tiffs] seek to engage in—marrying someone of the same sex—is fun-
damentally different from the conduct in which opposite sex couples 
seek to engage.”168 
This argument proved untenable to the Connecticut Supreme 
Court because, in its view, “[t]he plaintiffs . . . share the same interest 
in a committed and loving relationship as heterosexual persons who 
wish to marry, and they share the same interest in having a family and 
 
166 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
167 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that state’s 
same-sex marriage ban violates equal protection considerations while not reaching the 
due process claim); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting due process chal-
lenge to same-sex marriage ban but holding that it classified individuals according to 
their sex and thus requiring the application of heightened scrutiny under equal protec-
tion principles); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (striking down same-sex 
marriage ban on equal protection grounds while not reaching liberty claim); Lewis v. 
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs’ due process challenge to same-
sex marriage ban but holding that equal protection considerations require the state to 
provide the same rights and benefits to same-sex couples that it provides to heterosexual, 
married couples); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999) (holding that equality pro-
vision of state constitution requires the government to offer same-sex couples the same 
rights and benefits afforded to married heterosexual couples, but not reaching plaintiffs’ 
other claims).  The other two state supreme courts that have sided with the plaintiffs in 
challenges to same-sex marriage bans have accepted their liberty and equality claims.  See 
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 384; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003). 
168 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424. 
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raising their children in a loving and supportive environment.”169  
The court added that same-sex couples share with opposite sex ones 
“fundamental and overriding similarities . . . both with regard to mat-
ters relating to family and in all other respects.”170  As we have seen, 
this was the same understanding of gay people and their relationships 
articulated by the California court in In re Marriage Cases as it grap-
pled with substantive due process doctrine in the context of the 
state’s same-sex marriage ban.171 
Interestingly, although the Connecticut court, a little later in its 
opinion, repeated that same-sex and different-sex couples have “a 
multitude of characteristics . . . in common,” it did not elaborate on 
the nature of those characteristics beyond its earlier conclusion that 
the two groups shared similar interests in having committed and lov-
ing relationships and families.172  Indeed, the court did not say much 
about the bases for its assessment regarding the characteristics and 
attributes of gay people and their relationships, other than to note 
that the Connecticut legislature had enacted a civil unions law recog-
nizing their committed relationships.173  In this sense, it can be ar-
gued that the court’s normative assessments of gay people and their 
relationships were “extra-judicial” in the same way that U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices seemingly reached normative assessments about gay 
people in the sodomy cases (discussed in Part II.A.1) without explain-
ing how and why they did so.174 
It might be reasonable to expect a court like the Connecticut Su-
preme Court to be more forthcoming about its reasons for reaching 
certain conclusions regarding the capabilities and attributes of the 
group raising an equality claim in court.  On the other hand, we 
 
169 Id.  Like the state in the Connecticut same-sex marriage case, one of the defendants in 
the California case argued that the equal protection claim should be rejected because 
same-sex couples and different-sex ones are not similarly situated.  The California Su-
preme Court disagreed by noting that the two sets of couples sought marriage for the 
same reasons.  The court explained that 
[b]oth groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to enter into a for-
mal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family relationship that 
affords the same rights and privileges and imposes the same obligations and re-
sponsibilities.  Under these circumstances, there is no question but that these two 
categories of individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection 
principles that require a court to determine whether distinctions between the two 
groups justify the unequal treatment. 
  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54 (citations omitted). 
170 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424 n.19. 
171 See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
172 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424. 
173 See id. 
174 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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would not necessarily expect courts that might be called upon, for 
example, to assess the capabilities of racial minorities—or of men or 
women generally—to enter into loving and committed relationships 
to provide extensive explanations and support for the proposition 
that the group raising the equality claim is similarly situated to other 
groups when it comes to their reasons for seeking marriage licenses.  
It may be that assessments regarding the (ir)relevancy of sexual 
orientation for many (if not all) public policy purposes may be no 
different (and do not require more justification) than assessments 
regarding the (ir)relevancy of race and gender. 
Of course, the fact that a judge’s views about the relevancy of sex-
ual orientation for public policy purposes might impact her willing-
ness to accept (or not) a constitutional challenge to a law that treats 
individuals differently according to that characteristic is hardly sur-
prising, in the same way that a judge’s views on racial subordination 
and gender relations likely affect her assessment of race- and gender-
based discrimination claims.  My point is simply that the types of so-
called subjective views on sexual orientation that judges bring to bear 
in liberty and equality gay rights constitutional cases are quite similar.  
Indeed, what is crucial for our purposes is to note the similarity be-
tween the normative assessment about gay people and their relation-
ships reached by the Connecticut Supreme Court while engaged in 
equality review of its state’s same-sex marriage ban175 and that made 
by the California Supreme Court while engaged in its liberty review of 
the same kind of ban.176 
The similarities in the types of normative judgments brought to 
bear under both forms of judicial review is due in large part to equali-
ty’s dependence, that is, to the fact that judgments which fall outside 
of egalitarian considerations must be incorporated into the analysis 
to give the concept of equality its normative bite.177  In the end, those 
judgments are not terribly different from the types of “subjective” as-
sessments regarding considerations of morals and policy called for by 
liberty review.178 
To help explain this point, we can turn to the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s decision in Varnum v. Brien, a ruling that relied on equal pro-
tection considerations to strike down the state’s same-sex marriage 
ban.179  The government in Varnum argued that the ability of differ-
 
175 See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
178 See supra notes 157–65 and accompanying text. 
179 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
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ent-sex couples “to procreate naturally,” and the inability of same-sex 
couples to do the same, constituted a valid justification for denying 
the latter the opportunity to marry.180 
In addressing this contention, the state supreme court began by 
noting that the issue was not whether there were differences between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples but was instead whether those dif-
ferences were constitutionally relevant given the purposes of the law 
being challenged.181  As the court explained, echoing the claim made 
by Professor Westen in his article on equality discussed in Part I.B,182 
“the purposes of the law must be referenced in order to meaningfully 
evaluate whether the law equally protects all people similarly situated 
with respect to those purposes.”183 
What the court did not explain—a fact that is hardly surprising 
since courts and legal commentators rarely do—is that the normative 
assessment regarding a law’s purposes does not call for the application of egali-
tarian principles.  In order to decide the equality issue, in other words, 
the court had to consider moral and policy issues that went beyond 
considerations of equality.  This shows that the application of equality 
doctrine is not any more self-contained—nor does it cabin judicial 
discretion to a greater extent—than liberty review. 
The Iowa Supreme Court, after looking at its precedents, con-
cluded that there were two purposes behind the state’s legal recogni-
tion of marriage.  First, the court noted that “our marriage laws are 
rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining 
the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in 
organized society.”184  And second, the court explained “[t]hese 
laws . . . serve to recognize the status of the parties’ committed rela-
tionship.”185 
 
180 Id. at 882.  As in the same-sex marriage litigation in Connecticut, see supra notes 167–73 
and accompanying text, and California, see supra note 168, the issue of whether same- and 
different-sex couples were similarly situated arose in the Iowa appeal as a threshold issue.  
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883. 
181 The court explained that “[n]o two people or groups of people are the same in every way 
[and that] nearly every equal protection claim could be run aground onto the shoals of a 
threshold analysis if the two groups needed to be a mirror image of one another.”  Var-
num, 763 N.W.2d at 883. 
182 See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
183 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883; see also Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 581, 623 (2011) (“In a properly conducted, integrated equal protection analysis, the 
front lines of litigation will move . . . from whether group or persons are ‘similarly si-
tuated’ in relation to one another to the definition of the statutory purpose, and more 
fundamentally, of the social institution itself.  These inquiries can raise big questions, 
which may touch on deeply held beliefs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
184 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883 (citation omitted). 
185 Id. 
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Notice that neither the court’s process for determining the mar-
riage law’s purposes nor the substantive content of those purposes 
were driven or determined by egalitarian considerations.  Instead, the 
court looked outside of equality norms—by determining the purpos-
es of marriage—in order to begin to establish whether the constitu-
tional mandate of equality applied in the case. 
Also notice that determining the law’s purposes was precisely what 
the California Supreme Court did in its same-sex marriage case when 
it applied substantive due process doctrine.186  Although the objectives 
behind the courts’ liberty and equality analyses were different—in the 
case of the California court’s liberty review, the goal was to define the 
fundamental right that might be at issue, while in that of the Iowa 
court’s equality review, it was to determine whether same-sex couples 
were similarly situated to different-sex ones—the nature of the analys-
es was not, with each focused, as an initial matter, on the purposes of 
marriage. 
In same-sex marriage equality cases, then, the first normative 
question that is antecedent to the application of equality principles 
relates to the purposes of marriage.  But, as under the liberty analy-
sis,187 a court cannot limit itself to that antecedent question because, 
once it concludes that the main purpose of marriage is to encourage 
and promote committed relationships (regardless of procreative ca-
pabilities), it must then grapple with the additional normative inquiry 
of whether gay people are capable of entering into those relation-
ships.  The Iowa court, in conducting its equality review, like the Cali-
fornia court in its due process analysis,188 answered that question in 
the affirmative:  “[W]e find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated 
compared to heterosexual persons.  Plaintiffs are in committed and 
loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual 
couples.”189 
It may be argued that the assessment that lesbians and gay men 
are as capable as straight people of entering into committed and lov-
ing relationships is in fact one that is internal to equality, that is, one 
that is arrived at through the application of egalitarian norms and 
concerns.  But this is not the case.  For a judge to be able to conclude 
that gay people are like straight people for purposes of marriage, she 
must first determine what gay people are like.  That assessment re-
quires her to consider the role that sexual orientation, and specifical-
 
186 See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text. 
188 See id. 
189 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883. 
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ly attraction to others of the same sex, plays in the capability of indi-
viduals to enter into committed and loving relationships.  She must 
first determine, in effect, that sexual orientation is irrelevant given 
what she has already established are the principal purposes of mar-
riage.  It is only then that the judge will find the constitutional prin-
ciple of equality applicable to the dispute.190 
All of this suggests, as noted earlier,191 that the crucial question in 
same-sex marriage cases is not so much what equality demands, but is 
instead whether equality applies.  It is only after a judge determines 
(1) that the purpose of marriage is to encourage committed intimate 
relationships (regardless of procreative considerations) and (2) that 
gay people are capable of entering into and remaining in those rela-
tionships, that she will conclude that equality considerations are rele-
vant to the dispute. 
It can also be argued that equality concerns play a role in what I 
am here describing as antecedent normative questions because of a 
presumption, reasonably applied in same-sex marriage cases, that 
most individuals are similar in fundamental matters, such as in how 
they construct and depend on relationships of intimacy.  I concede 
that this kind of presumption likely plays a role in answering the an-
tecedent question of whether gay people are capable of forming 
committed and loving relationships.192  I also believe (although I can-
 
190 I have argued elsewhere that, in deciding which types of relationships to recognize, the 
government cannot be expected to remain neutral as to their moral worth.  See Carlos A. 
Ball, Against Neutrality in the Legal Recognition of Intimate Relationships, 9 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 321 (2008).  A slightly different version of the same essay can be found in MORAL 
ARGUMENT, SEXUAL MINORITIES, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:  ADVANCING THE DEBATE 75 
(Gordon Babst et al. eds., 2009). 
191 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
192 Westen argued in his Harvard Law Review article that equality presumptions are meaning-
less because “[t]he idea of equality . . . expresses no preference for ‘like’ treatment as op-
posed to ‘unlike’ treatment.  In requiring that likes be treated alike, it necessarily also re-
quires that unlike be treated unalike.”  Westen, supra note 1, at 572 (footnote omitted).  
He added that “[b]ecause the principle that ‘likes should be treated alike’ does not itself 
entail the idea that people are alike in more morally significant respects than they are 
unalike, any presumption of the latter kind must derive its substance from outside the 
idea of equality.”  Id. at 574.    
   Some commentators criticized Westen for not sufficiently appreciating the role that a 
presumption of equality can play in placing the burden of proof on those who would de-
fend unequal treatment.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 587–90; Greenawalt, supra 
note 99, at 1175–78.  This presumption can be crucial because, as Professor Chemerinsky 
put it, “[h]istory unequivocally demonstrates that what we most have to fear is govern-
ment treating differently people who deserve like treatment.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 
94, at 588.    
   In his later work, Westen conceded that a presumption in favor of equal treatment 
could be valuable in “help[ing] an actor decide which rule to adopt when he is norma-
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not defend the view here) that such a presumption is normatively ap-
propriate.193  Nonetheless, by its very nature, a presumption is not 
dispositive, which means that a judge who relies on the presumption 
to help decide a same-sex marriage case must still make an equality-
independent assessment regarding the nature and attributes of same-
sex relationships. 
It may very well be, for example, that a judge who believes that 
same-sex relationships can be as normatively good as different-sex 
ones—as measured, for example, by the capability of the parties to 
enter and remain in committed relationships—would not feel the 
same way about incestuous or polygamous relationships.  There are 
limits, in other words, to how far a generalized presumption that 
most individuals are similar in how they construct and depend on in-
timate relationships can go in helping judges make assessments about 
the normative value of the relationships at issue when engaging in 
equality review of marriage restrictions. 
It is also important to note that it is not just judges who endorse 
the equality challenges to same-sex marriage bans that must make an-
tecedent normative assessments prior to applying egalitarian consid-
erations; those who uphold the bans must do the same.  Not surpri-
singly, the latter have reached different normative conclusions about 
the main purposes of marriage laws than the former, usually by rea-
soning that those laws are primarily about promoting procreation.  
For example, a majority of the justices on the Washington Supreme 
Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the state’s same-sex mar-
riage ban, concluded that “marriage is traditionally linked to procrea-
tion and survival of the human race.  Heterosexual couples are the 
only couples who can produce biological offspring of the couple.”194  
 
tively uncertain about whether to treat certain people equally or unequally.”  WESTEN, su-
pra note 50, at 249.  Professor Greenawalt made this point in his 1983 essay assessing Wes-
ten’s Harvard Law Review article.  See Greenawalt, supra note 99, at 1175–78.  Peter Sarnoff 
has taken this point one step further by arguing that it is moral uncertainty as to how to 
regulate that ends up bolstering claims for equal treatment.  See Peter Sarnoff, Equality as 
Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377 (1999).  As Sarnoff explains,  
[p]rescriptive equality responds to [a] concern over arbitrary decision-making by 
minimizing the apparent risk of imposing unjust unequal treatment while increas-
ing to a lesser extent the apparent risk of imposing unjust equal treatment.  It does 
so by limiting unequal treatment to situations where decisionmakers possess a 
high level of confidence in the morality of their judgmental criteria.   
  Id. at 381 (footnotes omitted). 
193 See BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 103–12. 
194 Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 982–83 (Wash. 2006); see also id. at 1002 (“The bi-
nary character of marriage exists first because there are two sexes.  A society mindful of 
the biologically unique nature of the marital relationship and its special capacity for pro-
creation has ample justification for safeguarding this institution to promote procreation 
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For their part, a majority of the judges on the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, in also rejecting the challenge to the state’s same-sex marriage 
ban, concluded that “[t]he[] ‘inextricable link’ between marriage 
and procreation reasonably could support the definition of marriage 
as between a man and a woman only, because it is that relationship 
that is capable of producing biological offspring of both members 
(advances in reproductive technologies notwithstanding).”195  Given 
that these judges concluded that procreation was an essential com-
ponent of marriage, the difference in the reproductive capabilities of 
same-sex couples and different-sex ones became relevant to their 
equality analysis, at least when applying the highly deferential ration-
al basis test.196 
Although judges deciding the constitutionality of same-sex mar-
riage bans have disagreed on the essential purposes or functions of 
marriage, there has been little disagreement among them on the ca-
pacity and attributes of gay people as they relate to the entering into 
and remaining in committed and loving relationships.197  If anything, 
it seems as of late that courts upholding the marriage bans in the face 
 
and a stable environment for raising children.”  (Johnson, J., concurring) (footnote omit-
ted)). 
195 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630–31 (Md. 2007); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 519 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J., dissenting) (“[A] couple that is in-
capable of engaging in the type of sexual conduct that can result in children is not simi-
larly situated to a couple that is capable of engaging in such conduct with respect to legis-
lation that is intended to privilege and regulate that conduct.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 
N.E.2d 15, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The differentiation between opposite-sex and same-
sex couples in Indiana marriage law is based on inherent differences reasonably and ra-
tionally distinguishing the two classes:  the ability to procreate ‘naturally.’”); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 21 (N.Y. 2006) (“[M]arriage was instituted to address the fact that 
sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can result in pregnancy and child-
birth.”). 
196 Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (“Under the highly deferential rational basis inquiry, encourag-
ing procreation between opposite-sex individuals within the framework of marriage is a 
legitimate government interest furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).  
Given the deferential nature of the rational basis test, it is not particularly surprising that 
courts which apply that standard usually end up upholding the constitutionality of the 
marriage bans.  See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630–31; Hernandez; 855 N.E.2d at 21–22; 
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982–83.  Not every court that has applied the rational basis test, 
however, has concluded that procreation is an essential aspect of the meaning of mar-
riage.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down the state’s ban against 
same-sex marriage applying the rational basis test after concluding that commitment and 
affection, rather than procreation, were the constitutive elements of marriage.  See Goo-
dridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“[I]t is the exclusive 
and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting 
of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.” (footnote omitted)). 
197 For example, even though the Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the state’s ban on same-sex marriage, it nonetheless recognized “that same-sex couples 
enter significant, committed relationships . . . .”  Andersen, 138 P.3d at 985. 
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of equality challenges are reaching the opposite normative judgments 
on the differences between same-sex couples and different-sex ones 
than might be expected given the cases’ outcomes. 
I say this because of the seeming popularity among some judges of 
the so-called “responsible procreation” argument.  This argument 
holds that while same-sex couples must engage in considerable plan-
ning to have children (either through adoption or with the assistance 
of reproductive technology), most heterosexuals can reproduce with-
out having to think much about either the process or consequences 
of having children.198  As a result, straights need the stability and ben-
efits provided by marriage more than lesbians and gay men, and 
therefore, it is argued, it is rational for the State to make marriage 
available only to the former.199 
Judges who accept this argument are relying on the different ways 
in which gays and (most) straights become parents to reach norma-
tive conclusions about the degree of stability and commitment that 
accompanies the personal and familial relationships of lesbians and 
gay men.  Far from concluding that those with a same-sex sexual 
orientation are incapable of forming committed and loving relation-
ships built partly around the raising of children, these courts reason 
that gay people are, in effect, too capable (at least when compared to 
some heterosexuals).  In the end, courts who accept the “reasonable 
procreation” argument rely on this normative judgment to hold that 
same-sex couples and (at least some) different-sex couples are not 
similarly situated when it comes to mutual commitment and the rais-
 
198 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“The Legislature could . . . find that [male-female] relation-
ships are all too often casual or temporary . . . [and that] same-sex couples . . . can be-
come parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels, 
but they do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse.”); see also Morrison, 821 
N.E.2d at 26 (“Members of a same-sex couple who wish to have a child . . . have already 
demonstrated their commitment to child-rearing, by virtue of the difficulty of obtaining a 
child through adoption or assisted reproduction . . . . Conversely, the ‘casual’ intimate 
acts of a same-sex couple will never result in a child, but those of an opposite-sex couple 
can and frequently do.”). 
199 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“The Legislature could find that unstable relationships be-
tween people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into 
or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that pro-
moting stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more.”); see also Morrison, 
821 N.E.2d at 25 (“One of the State’s key interests in supporting opposite-sex marriage is 
[to] . . . encourage[] opposite-sex couples who, by definition, are the only type of couples 
that can reproduce on their own by engaging in sex with little or no contemplation of the 
consequences that might result, i.e. a child, to procreate responsibly.”).  For a critique of 
the responsible procreation argument as a basis for upholding same-sex marriage bans, 
see Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 403 (2009). 
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ing of children, and that therefore their differential treatment under 
the marriage laws is justified. 
Putting aside the merits of these differing arguments and posi-
tions, it should be clear by now that regardless of how a court rules 
on the validity of an equality-based challenge to a same-sex marriage 
ban, normative assessments that are independent of egalitarian con-
cerns must be incorporated into the analysis.  Neither the discretion 
that is part of making those assessments, nor the scope of the norma-
tive inquiry, is significantly different from what is required of judges 
in assessing the validity of liberty-based challenges to gay marriage 
bans. 
2.  Romer v. Evans 
The types of normative assessments that judges make in deciding 
gay rights equality cases, as we have seen in several same-sex marriage 
rulings, can be quite explicit.200  But, as the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Romer v. Evans suggests, the assessments can also be implicit.201  The 
Court in Romer struck down a voter-approved amendment to the Col-
orado Constitution that would have prohibited state and local gov-
ernments from adopting measures protecting lesbians, gay men, and 
bisexuals from discrimination.202  The fact that the amendment 
broadly deprived the government of the authority to regulate in 
many areas of law,203 when combined with the fact that it only tar-
geted gay people for differential treatment,204 led the Court to con-
clude that it was motivated by animus toward them and was therefore 
unconstitutional.205 
Unlike the same-sex marriage cases decided on equality grounds 
discussed in the previous section, the Court’s Romer opinion does not 
contain explicit normative assessments about the capabilities and 
attributes of gay people.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude 
that those assessments played an implicit role in the Court’s under-
standing of the controversy before it. 
 
200 See supra notes 167–99 and accompanying text. 
201 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
202 Id. at 624. 
203 Id. (“Amendment 2, in explicit terms, . . . prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial 
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the named class [i.e., 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals].”). 
204 Id. at 632 (“[T]he amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undif-
ferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form of leg-
islation.”). 
205 Id. at 634 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disad-
vantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”). 
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The following hypothetical helps explain why this is the case:  
Suppose that a municipality enacts an ordinance that prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against kleptomaniacs.  This local legislative 
action leads to a backlash among state wide voters who, disapproving 
of kleptomaniacs, quickly endorse a constitutional amendment de-
priving state and local governments of the authority to provide dis-
crimination protection to kleptomaniacs.  Would the Supreme Court 
hold that such an amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause? 
The answer is likely no.  As Professor Pamela Karlan has noted, 
“[a]ll sorts of laws reflect the majority’s disapproval of (‘animus to-
ward’) an unpopular group, and yet are constitutional.”206  An exam-
ple of such a statute is the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
which specifically excludes kleptomaniacs (and a select group of oth-
ers including gamblers, pyromaniacs, transvestites and even gay 
people) from discrimination protection in employment, public ac-
commodations, and the provision of government services.207  As Kar-
lan explains, “[t]he decision to exclude [these individuals] from the 
protections others enjoy surely reflects the majority’s dislike of these 
politically unpopular groups.  And yet, it is hard to imagine the Su-
preme Court declaring the ADA unconstitutional for under-
breadth.”208 
If disapproval of the group in question is by itself not enough to 
explain the result in Romer, then we need to look elsewhere for an 
explanation of its holding.  One possibility might be that, as Professor 
Karlan posits, the Court’s equality analysis in Romer was influenced by 
liberty considerations.  That is, it might be that a majority of the 
Court’s members was troubled by the Colorado antigay amendment 
because of its impact on the ability of gay people to make intimacy-
related choices.209  The problem with this explanation is that it is in-
consistent with Bowers v. Hardwick,210 a case that was not mentioned in, 
much less explicitly overruled by, Romer.211 
 
206 Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 484. 
207 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2)(2010). 
208 Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 485. 
209 As Professor Karlan explains, 
[A] liberty-based perspective may explain why a law aimed at stripping protection 
from gays, lesbians, and bisexuals does not constitute a legitimate government 
purpose, even if a law depriving, say, thieves, does.  Understanding the nature of 
the liberty interest in intimate association may explain why discriminating among 
individuals on the basis of the choices they make is impermissible. 
  Id. at 485. 
210 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  Karlan, writing before the Supreme Court overruled Hardwick in 
Lawrence, acknowledged that her interpretation of Romer “confronts head-on the contin-
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It seems to me that a more plausible explanation for the outcome 
in Romer is that by the time the Court decided the case, a majority of 
its members had reached normative conclusions about the sexuality 
of gay people—and of how its expression should not impose on them 
certain legal disabilities—that were quite different from the norma-
tive assessments reached by the Hardwick Court.212  This does not nec-
essarily mean, as Professor Karlan suggests, that a majority of the 
Court in 1996 relied on liberty considerations to determine the 
equality rights of gay people.213  But it does likely mean that a majority 
of the Court’s members was by then prepared to view the engaging in 
same-sex sexual conduct as normatively irrelevant, at least for pur-
poses of whether lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals should have the 
opportunity to seek antidiscrimination protection under the law. 
In contrast, the Court would probably not find the conduct en-
gaged in by kleptomaniacs to be normatively irrelevant in the same 
way, thus likely leading it to conclude that depriving them of antidi-
scrimination protection would pass constitutional muster (perhaps in 
a way that is analogous to depriving felons of the opportunity to 
 
ued vitality of Hardwick.”  Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 
485. 
211 Professor Karlan believes that liberty and equality analyses inform and reinforce each 
other. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality, supra note 34, at 63 (“[J]ust as 
equality can “backstop” liberty, so too liberty can serve to backstop equality.  That is, liber-
ty arguments can explain why two classes of individuals cannot be treated unequally.”); 
Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 474 (“[T]he ideas of equali-
ty and liberty expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge 
from and reinforce the other.”).  Tribe makes a similar point when he reasons that “due 
process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different 
inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.”  See Tribe, supra note 34, at 
1898.  As does Kenji Yoshino when he notes that “[t]oo much emphasis has been placed 
on the formal distinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection 
guarantees and the liberty claims made under the due process or other guarantees.  In 
practice, the Court does not abide by this distinction.”  Yoshino, supra note 34, at 749.  
The Supreme Court in Lawrence seemed to endorse the notion that there are mutually 
reinforcing aspects to liberty and equality protections.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 
(“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct pro-
tected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a deci-
sion on the latter point advances both interests.”).    
   Although I do not address the issue here, the apparent hybrid nature of many liberty 
and equality constitutional claims provides an additional reason to question the presump-
tion that equality review is a more legitimate judicial enterprise than liberty review.  This 
is because if courts (actually and appropriately) rely on equality principles to interpret 
the meaning of constitutionally protected liberty (and vice versa), it undermines the no-
tion that liberty review is different from equality review in fundamental ways. 
212 I discuss the normative assessments related to sexual orientation contained in Hardwick in 
supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text. 
213 See Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 485–86. 
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vote).  The different way in which the Court would likely deal with 
the hypothetical constitutional provision involving kleptomaniacs, 
when compared with how it dealt with the amendment at issue in 
Romer, suggests the extent to which the majority in that case brought 
to bear positive normative judgments about gay people into its analy-
sis. 
Over thirty years ago, Professor Laurence Tribe wrote an article in 
which he criticized constitutional theories, such as that of John Hart 
Ely,214 which viewed the document primarily in procedural terms.215  
In doing so, Tribe asserted that the Constitution is saturated with 
substantive norms, ones that are not only reflected in provisions like 
the First Amendment (with its defense of values based on freedom of 
speech and religion),216 but also in the Equal Protection Clause.  
Tribe noted that, in order to determine whether particular groups 
have been discriminated against in constitutionally improper ways, 
judges must determine whether the classifications chosen by the legis-
lature reflect prejudicial stereotypes, a determination that is substan-
tive in nature because it requires judges to agree or disagree with “the 
judgments that lie behind the stereotype.”217 
What truly matters in showing a violation of constitutional equality 
principles, Tribe argued, is not a question of process.218  Nor is it the 
mere existence of prejudice (since laws, for example, aimed at cur-
tailing burglary are based on prejudice against burglars).219  Instead, 
the key issue is one of substantive values as determined by the 
courts.220  This means, as Kathleen Sullivan has put it in summarizing 
 
214 See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
215 Tribe, supra note 113. 
216 As Tribe put it, 
[o]ne difficulty that immediately confronts process theories is the stubbornly subs-
tantive character of so many of the Constitution’s most crucial commitments:  
commitments defining the values that we as a society, acting politically, must re-
spect.  Plainly, the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty and its prohi-
bition of religious establishment are substantive in this sense. 
  Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted). 
217 Id. at 1075 (emphasis omitted). 
218 See id. 
219 See id.  Ely pointed to laws aimed at burglars, “a group toward which there is widespread 
social hostility,” ELY, supra note 12, at 154, as examples of laws that should survive judicial 
scrutiny.  Id. at 162. 
220 Tribe explained that 
[t]he crux of any determination that a law unjustly discriminates against a 
group . . . is not that the law emerges from a flawed process, or that the burden it 
imposes affects an independently fundamental right, but that the law is part of a 
pattern that denies those subject to it a meaningful opportunity to realize their 
humanity.  Necessarily, such an approach must look beyond process to identify 
and proclaim fundamental substantive rights.  Whatever difficulties this may entail, 
it seems plain that important aspects of constitutional law, including the determi-
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Tribe’s thesis, that the application of the constitutional norm of 
equality “always require[s] irreducibly substantive normative judg-
ments, without which we cannot distinguish the equal protection 
rights of gay people from those of burglars.”221 
Admittedly, the normative assessments about gay people and their 
sexuality that the Romer Court likely reached are not as evident as 
those that are part of the recent state supreme court rulings striking 
down same-sex marriage bans.222  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to con-
clude that such positive normative assessments—based on “what it 
means to be a person, and to have a sexual identity”223—played an 
important role in the Romer Court’s equality review given both the 
outcome of the case and the likelihood that it would have ruled diffe-
rently had the state constitutional amendment at issue targeted a 
group whose identity or conduct, from the Court’s perspective, de-
served less normative respect. 
C.  Liberty’s Subjectivity vs. Equality’s Dependence:  A Reprise 
As noted in the Introduction, one crucial reason for the perceived 
reduced legitimacy of liberty review, when compared to equality re-
view, is the belief that the former calls for a degree of judicial subjec-
tivity that the latter does not.224  This view holds that judges are more 
likely to stray beyond their proper judicial role when they strike down 
a law under substantive due process grounds than when they do so 
under equality ones.225  I have here sought to challenge this perspec-
tive by showing how the normative assessments that judges make 
when reviewing laws in gay rights cases under equality principles are 
quite similar to those they reach when engaging in liberty review.  As 
we have seen, those assessments—regarding questions such as the re-
levancy of sexual orientation in public policy matters, the purpose of 
the institution of marriage, and the capabilities of gay people to form 
committed and loving relationships—have played crucial roles in the 
courts’ analyses irrespective of whether the constitutional claim at is-
sue is grounded in equality or liberty principles.226 
 
nation of which groups deserve special protection, can be given significant content 
in no other way. 
  Tribe, supra note 113, at 1077 (footnotes omitted). 
221 Kathleen Sullivan, The Scholarship of Laurence Tribe:  Law and Topology, 42 TULSA L. REV. 
949, 951–52 (2007). 
222 See supra notes 167–99 and accompanying text. 
223 Tribe, supra note 113, at 1076. 
224 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
225 See id. 
226 See supra Parts II.A and II.B. 
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Someone who is skeptical of my argument that equality review 
does not cabin a judge’s discretion to a significantly greater extent 
than does liberty review may argue that when a judge engages in 
equality review of legislation, the substantive right at issue has already 
been determined through the legislative process, limiting the judicial 
function to the question of how the right can be distributed without 
offending the Constitution.227  In contrast, the fundamental rights 
analysis under substantive due process calls on judges to search for 
(or find) constitutional entitlements that are, by their very nature, 
judge-created.228  This means, for example, that in assessing liberty-
based challenges brought against same-sex marriage bans, courts 
must determine whether there is a fundamental right to marry, and if 
there is, whether it is broad enough to include same-sex couples.229  
In contrast, in assessing equality-based challenges to those same bans, 
courts do not need to determine whether there is (or should be) a 
right to marry, but must concern themselves only with how that right 
is distributed. 
I concede that when the two forms of judicial review are looked at 
from this perspective, it appears that liberty review encourages great-
er judicial subjectivity because it requires judges to decide whether 
there is a legal entitlement to begin with.  But as I have sought to illu-
strate here, when one compares how judges actually go about the 
process of weighing constitutional equality with how they weigh con-
stitutional liberty, there is no longer a clear difference in the degree 
of judicial subjectivity that is part of the constitutional analysis. 
What I believe explains the (mis)perception that liberty review al-
lows for significantly greater judicial normative discretion than equal-
ity review is the fact that liberty’s subjectivity is more obvious than 
equality’s dependence.230  That is, it is not as readily apparent that 
judges must rely on normative assessments when deciding whether 
and how to apply equality principles when compared to how they 
grapple with liberty considerations.  But when one digs a little dee-
per, as I have sought to do here, one finds that judges entertaining 
equality claims routinely make normative judgments that are quite 
similar to the ones they make when entertaining liberty claims. 
 
227 I thank my colleague Adil Haque for raising this possible objection to my argument. 
228 See Conkle, supra note 14, at 69 (noting that the Supreme Court, in interpreting the Li-
berty Clause, “has declared for itself the power to define otherwise unenumerated consti-
tutional rights”). 
229 The Supreme Court, of course, has already determined that there is a fundamental right 
to marry.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
230 For a discussion of equality’s dependence, see supra Part I.B. 
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It also bears noting that, although in this Article I emphasize judi-
cial normative assessments in liberty and equality gay rights cases that 
are similar in nature, there are some normative assessments that are 
distinctive to equality review.  For example, in deciding whether to 
apply heightened scrutiny to particular classifications, courts must de-
termine if the classifying trait “bears [any] relation to the individual’s 
ability to participate in and contribute to society.”231  It seems clear 
that this type of analysis, when applied to gay rights cases, invites 
judges to bring to bear their views on the impact that sexual orienta-
tion has on the character and capabilities of individuals, an assess-
ment that is intrinsically normative.  While engaging in equality re-
view of its state’s same-sex marriage ban, for example, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the “characteristic that 
defines the members of this group—attraction to persons of the same 
sex—bears no logical relationship to their ability to perform in socie-
ty, either in familial relations or otherwise as productive citizens.”232 
Normative assessments are also part of another determination that 
some courts have made in deciding whether sexual orientation classi-
fications merit heightened scrutiny, namely, whether sexual orienta-
tion, as the Iowa Supreme Court put it, “forms a significant part of a 
person’s identity.”233  The court answered that question in the affir-
mative when it concluded that “[s]exual orientation influences the 
formation of personal relationships between all people—
heterosexual, gay, or lesbian—to fulfill each person’s fundamental 
needs for love and attachment.”234  The Connecticut Supreme Court 
reasoned similarly when it noted that “[b]ecause sexual orientation is 
such an essential component of personhood, even if there is some possibili-
ty that a person’s sexual preference can be altered, it would be wholly 
unacceptable for the state to require anyone to do so.”235 
As these examples illustrate, judicial review of gay rights cases on 
equality grounds is infused with normative assessments about the 
meaning, relevance, and impact of having a same-sex sexual orienta-
tion.  These assessments, unique to equality review, also undermine 
the notion that equality review is more neutral or self-contained than 
is liberty review. 
 
231 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). 
232 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008); see also Conaway v. 
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609 (Md. 2007) (“Gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons likewise have 
been subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute mea-
ningfully to society.”). 
233 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009) (citation omitted). 
234 Id. 
235 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432 (emphasis added). 
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III.  THE LEGITIMACY OF EQUALITY AND LIBERTY REVIEW:  
INSTITUTIONAL AND REMEDIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are other reasons—beyond the supposed greater subjectivi-
ty that is part of liberty review—that account for the greater perceived 
legitimacy of equality review.  In this last section of the Article, I ex-
plore two additional arguments that are frequently raised on behalf 
of that greater legitimacy.  The first is based on the notion of institu-
tional legitimacy, that is, on the idea that when courts engage in 
equality review, they reinforce representative democracy in ways that 
they do not when they engage in liberty review.236  The second is 
based on the idea of remedial legitimacy, that is, the view that when 
courts strike down legislation under due process principles, they re-
strict the legislature’s ability to regulate in ways that are significantly 
more intrusive than when they void a law under equal protection 
principles.237  As I did in Part II, I will here use gay rights constitution-
al litigation to question both of these generally accepted explanations 
for the greater legitimacy of equality review. 
A.  Institutional Legitimacy 
The judicial review of legislation on equality grounds gains consi-
derable legitimacy from the widely held view that it reinforces rather 
than undermines democratic rule.  The Constitution does not guar-
antee any group (whether racial, social, ideological or otherwise) par-
ticular legislative results.  But the Equal Protection Clause has been 
viewed, largely as the result of John Hart Ely’s influential scholarship, 
as the principal constitutional provision which helps guarantee that 
elected officials will represent all of their constituents—by accounting 
for the interests of everyone—when legislating.  As Ely explained it, 
this theory of representation, which is a central component of repub-
lican government, does not 
mean that groups that constitute minorities of the population can never 
be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude a refusal to 
represent them, the denial to minorities of what Professor [Ronald] Dwor-
kin has called ‘equal concern and respect in the design and administra-
tion of the political institutions that govern them.’  The Fourteenth 
 
236 See infra notes 238–65 and accompanying text. 
237 See infra notes 266–96 and accompanying text.  I also in this Part question the notion that 
successful equality-based challenges, and the resulting incentives to broaden the impact 
of legislation, always serve to protect against arbitrary and unreasonable government ac-
tions.  See infra notes 297–317 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is obviously our Constitution’s 
most dramatic embodiment of this ideal.238 
From this perspective, the principal function of judicial review is 
to determine when the democratic process has malfunctioned.239  The 
crucial point for Ely was that, in contrast to the “judicial imposition of 
‘fundamental values,’” “a “representation-reinforcing”  understand-
ing of the Constitution “is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary 
is entirely supportive of, the American system of representational 
democracy.”240  While Ely, therefore, was dismissive of substantive due 
process doctrine,241 he viewed the Equal Protection Clause as the 
Constitution’s key provision guaranteeing that legislatures account 
for the interests of all when enacting laws.242 
But as Rebecca Brown has persuasively argued, it is not clear why 
the representation-reinforcing value of judicial review should end 
with equality claims.  It is true that when legislation classifies individ-
uals—by, for example, providing a benefit to (or imposing a burden 
on) some that it does not provide to (or impose on) others—it is 
usually clear who has gained and who has lost in the political and leg-
islative battles leading up to enactment, and it is therefore possible to 
apply the Equal Protection Clause in ways that seek to determine 
whether the interests of the losers were sufficiently taken into ac-
count.243 
 
238 ELY, supra note 12, at 82 (footnotes omitted). 
239 Ely explained that 
[m]alfunction occurs . . . [when] (1) the ins are choking off the channels of polit-
ical change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though 
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective 
majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or 
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying 
that minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative system. 
  Id. at 103 (footnote omitted). 
240 Id. at 101–02. 
241 Ely famously referred to substantive due process as “a contradiction in terms—sort of like 
‘green pastel redness.’”  Id. at 18 (footnote omitted). 
242 Id. at 82; see also id. at 100 (noting that several of the Constitution’s provisions—“centrally 
but not exclusively the Equal Protection Clause—reflect a realization that access [to the 
decision making process] will not always be sufficient”).  A process-based understanding 
of judicial review in equality cases was endorsed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in a case involving the constitutionality of the military’s exclusion of lesbian 
and gay service members.  See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d. 1428, 1440 (“[E]qual pro-
tection doctrine does not prevent the majority from enacting laws based on its substantive 
value choices.  Equal protection simply requires that the majority apply its values even-
handedly.  Indeed, equal protection doctrine plays an important role in perfecting, ra-
ther than frustrating, the democratic process.”), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988). 
243 This determination, of course, is driven by the level of judicial review required by the 
classification in question.  “The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and 
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legiti-
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But, as Brown notes, laws that restrict liberty can also leave losers 
in their wake because they almost always have a greater impact on 
some than on others.244  This is true even if the law in question does 
not, on its face, draw classifications among individuals.245  Those 
whose liberty interests are burdened by facially neutral laws can be 
thought to have lost in political and legislative processes in the same 
way that groups lose when they are, for example, denied a benefit 
that is legislatively conferred on others.246  Courts, therefore, should 
also make themselves available to assess the validity of legislation that 
impacts on liberty considerations to make sure that legislators ac-
counted for the interests of everyone when enacting the law in ques-
tion.247  As Brown puts it, 
if courts are to ensure that legislators have satisfied their obligation to 
represent, they must be available to look at the reasons for which liberty-
impairing legislation has been passed.  Only by engaging in that initial 
examination can a court ascertain that the interests of those bearing the 
burden have not been valued negatively or at zero, a breach of the repre-
sentatives’ obligation under the Constitution.  Thus, there is no theoreti-
cal warrant for limiting the reach of a representation-reinforcing judi-
ciary to claims expressly invoking equality.248 
Sodomy laws are a good example of what Professor Brown has in 
mind.  Although a handful of jurisdictions, beginning in the late 
 
mate state interest.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(citations omitted).  But when a legislative classification relies on race, alienage, or na-
tional origin, which are so-called suspect classifications, the Court applies strict scrutiny, 
requiring that they be “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  And when a classification is based on gender or illegitimacy, which are so-
called quasi-suspect classifications, the Court has called for an intermediate form of scru-
tiny, one that requires a substantial connection to an important governmental interest.  
Id. at 440–41. 
244 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1532. 
245 See infra notes 246–56 and accompanying text. 
246 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1544 (“If the representative fails in the obligation to accord 
this minimal concern to the interests of those bearing the burdens, then the law is 
we/they legislation, despite its neutral form.”). 
247 Brown explains that the democratic process can malfunction even when the enacted leg-
islation fails to explicitly classify individuals: 
[I]n a world of increasingly diverse personal and moral values, supporting very dif-
ferent notions of the good life, the communion of interests between representa-
tives and represented can degrade even when laws nominally operate evenhanded-
ly.  For example, laws that provide that “no one may [blank]” can exploit 
difference as effectively as a classification, when the blank is an activity that “we,” 
the political ins, have no wish to do, but that “they,” the outs, claim a profound 
need to do in pursuit of personal fulfillment.  This type of prohibition suggests a 
more refined way than the equality theorists anticipated to sever the communion 
of interests between representative and represented that otherwise helps protect 
against oppressive laws in a representative democracy. 
  Id. at 1498. 
248 Id. at 1533. 
60 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
1960s, amended their sodomy statutes by making them gender-
specific (that is, by decriminalizing different-sex sodomy and, for the 
first time, specifically criminalizing the same-sex variety), the vast ma-
jority of sodomy statutes in American history were facially neutral.249  
In theory, these laws applied to everyone, yet the word “sodomy” in 
the twentieth century came to be associated almost exclusively with 
gay male sex.250  As a practical matter, therefore, gay people were 
burdened to a much greater extent than straight people by facially 
neutral sodomy laws.251 
This greater burden was manifested in three different ways.  First, 
although arrests for consensual sodomy in private during the second 
half of the twentieth century were rare, they were not completely un-
heard of, and, not surprisingly, it was gay men who sometimes found 
themselves at the wrong end of those arrests.252  Second, law enforce-
ment agencies have traditionally been quite aggressive in prosecuting 
gay men for solicitation of consensual (and unremunerated) sodomy, 
while ignoring heterosexuals who solicit other straight people with 
the intent to engage in the same.253  And third, and most perniciously 
 
249 BALL, supra note 75.  The first state to enact a gender-specific sodomy statute was Kansas 
in 1969.  Id. at 208.  Texas did the same four years later.  Id.  Eventually, “Arkansas, Ken-
tucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Tennessee also decriminalized different-sex sod-
omy while, for the first time, explicitly prohibiting the same-sex variety.”  Id. 
250 Id. at 207.  A dictionary published in 1996 defined sodomy as “carnal copulation between 
male persons or with beasts.”  THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER’S COMPREHENSIVE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1193 (1996); see also Tribe, supra note 34, at 1905 
(“[A]lthough ‘sodomy’ is by no means a ‘gays only’ act, the term has come to carry a 
strong cultural association with gay male, and to a much lesser extent lesbian, sexual ac-
tivities . . . .”). 
251 See infra notes 252–54 and accompanying text. 
252 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986). 
253 There is considerable evidence that law enforcement officials frequently target consen-
sual and uncompensated male on male sexual solicitation and conduct in public places—
frequently by conducting extensive and expensive investigations—while paying little at-
tention to the same when the sexual actors in question are of different sexes.  See Christo-
pher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality:  How States Use Standing Doctrine to Insulate 
Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29, 84 (noting that “[m]any po-
lice departments employ undercover operations designed to entrap gay men into offering 
or requesting oral sex . . . . Although most sodomy laws apply equally to heterosexual and 
homosexual sodomy, police departments do not expend resources in search of hetero-
sexuals willing to give or receive oral sex (or other forms of sodomy).”); see also Martinez 
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2005 WL 2143333 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005), aff’d, 445 F.3d 158 
(2d Cir. 2006) (ordering defendants to pay $464,000 to compensate plaintiff for police 
policy of arresting men for public lewdness at a subway station without probable cause); 
Baluyut v. Superior Court, 911 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1996) (presenting evidence of ten solicita-
tion arrests over a two year period which led the trial court to conclude “that the opera-
tion was focused solely on persons who had a proclivity to engage in homosexual con-
duct”). 
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of all, the mere existence of sodomy laws contributed to the percep-
tion that all gay people—and not just those who were prosecuted un-
der those laws—were criminals and second-class citizens.254 
Despite the greater burden imposed on gay people by facially neu-
tral sodomy statutes, their neutrality made equal protection chal-
lenges difficult.255  As a result, the Equal Protection Clause never 
played much of a role in challenging facially neutral sodomy laws.256  
 
254 Pamela Karlan has noted that “[t]he real problems with prohibitions on same-sex intima-
cy . . . come from the collateral consequences of such laws:  the way in which they under-
gird ‘discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres’ and tell gay people 
that their choices about how to live their lives are unworthy of respect.”  Karlan, Loving 
Lawrence, supra note 34, at 1453 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575).  Justice O’Connor 
made a similar point in her Lawrence concurrence: 
Texas’ sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more 
difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.  In-
deed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, sti-
pulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law “legally sanctions discrimi-
nation against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,” 
including in the areas of “employment, family issues, and housing.” 
  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing State v. Morales, 826 
S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)); see also id. at 584 (“The State has admitted that 
because of the sodomy law, being homosexual carries the presumption of being a crimi-
nal.” (citing Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 202–03)). 
255 Successful equal protection challenges of facially neutral laws grounded in disparate 
treatment, such as the one brought in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), are rare.  
See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 n.12 (1987) (noting that Yick Wo is one of those 
“examples of . . . rare cases in which a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact demon-
strated a constitutional violation”).  As Kenji Yoshino has noted, 
[i]n the vast run of cases [in the last thirty years], only facial discrimination has 
drawn heightened scrutiny under the equal protection guarantees.  If legislators 
have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like “race” or the name of a 
particular racial group in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally ap-
ply ordinary rational basis review.  This tendency is true even if the state action has 
an egregiously negative impact on a protected group.   
  Yoshino, supra note 34, at 764. 
256 The majority of constitutional challenges brought against facially neutral sodomy statutes 
prior to Lawrence did not include an equal protection claim.  Instead, most cases were 
based on due process considerations only. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 
(1973) (per curiam); Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978); Doe v. 
Commonwealth Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff’d, 425 U.S. 901 (1976); 
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Louisiana v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000).  
The only exceptions appear to be two cases decided by state supreme courts in 1980.  See 
New York v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 
(Pa. 1980).    
   Professor Laurence Tribe, who represented Michael Hardwick in his challenge to 
Georgia’s sodomy law before the Supreme Court, has explained his reasoning for not 
pursuing an equal protection claim in that case: 
I was obviously aware of how even facially gender-neutral antisodomy laws like 
Georgia’s were used principally to harass—and to justify refusals to employ, pro-
mote, or extend benefits to gay men (and to a lesser but still troublesome extent, 
lesbians).  I also knew that many of my gay friends and many gay rights advocates 
saw Michael Hardwick’s lawsuit as an ideal opportunity to topple a major source of 
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This meant that the representation-reinforcing features of that provi-
sion were generally unavailable to individuals interested in challeng-
ing the constitutionality of those laws. 
If the facial neutrality of most sodomy laws provided significant 
constitutional immunity to challenges under the Equal Protection 
Clause, there was still the question of whether they violated the Liber-
ty Clause.  But when a gay man in Bowers v. Hardwick challenged 
Georgia’s facially neutral sodomy statute under that theory, the Court 
fell back on considerations of judicial restraint to reject it.257  As far as 
the Hardwick Court was concerned, the decision of whether to crimi-
nalize sodomy was a legislative rather than a judicial one.258  The 
problem, as Professor Brown explains, is that the Court’s conclusion 
in cases like Hardwick that 
most liberty claims [are] best left to the “democratic process” begs the 
question whether the democratic process, including the representative 
obligation to give equal concern and respect to all constituents, has mal-
functioned.  If it has, then the Court does no favors to democracy by 
looking the other way.  Rather, it has an obligation to reinforce the re-
presentation that is the core of democracy.259 
It may be that, if Lawrence v. Texas is any indication, the Court is 
beginning to take this obligation more seriously.  Rather than accept 
the state’s argument, as it had in Hardwick,260 that a majority of citi-
zens are entitled to express their disapproval of same-sex sexual con-
 
the “straight world’s” oppression of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.  But the Supreme 
Court that was sitting in 1986 seemed most unlikely to think of a man getting oral 
sex from another man as no different from a man getting oral sex from a wom-
an—even if the Georgia legislature saw fit to outlaw both acts in a single breath.  If 
a majority of the Justices were inclined to think of the two acts as intrinsically and 
profoundly different, persuading them that a facially neutral law was being used to 
treat homosexuals differently was unlikely to dent their disposition to uphold the 
law. 
  Tribe, supra note 34, at 1951. 
257 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195 (“There should be . . . great resistance to expand the substan-
tive reach of th[e] [Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires redefining the category 
of rights deemed to be fundamental.  Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself 
further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.”).  Jus-
tice Scalia made a similar point in his dissent in Lawrence when he noted that Texas’s de-
cision to criminalize same-sex sodomy was “well within the range of traditional democrat-
ic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 
‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.”  Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
258 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194–95. 
259 Brown, supra note 1, at 1556. 
260 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (noting that “the presumed belief of a majority of the elec-
torate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” constituted a 
sufficient justification for the sodomy law). 
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duct through the criminal law,261 the Lawrence Court instead protected 
the liberty interests of gay people from a statute that, as it acknowl-
edged, stigmatized them through its mere existence.262 
The fact that the Texas sodomy statute was not facially neutral 
meant that the Lawrence Court had the option of striking it on Equal 
Protection grounds, one that some commentators have argued the 
Court should have pursued.263  But from an institutional legitimacy 
perspective, it does not make sense to suggest that the Court had a 
representation-reinforcing obligation to strike down the provisions of 
the four states that had gender-specific sodomy laws at the time of 
Lawrence, while leaving in place the facially neutral statutes that were 
on the books in nine other jurisdictions.264  Gay people living in those 
nine states were as much the victims of a legislative process that failed 
to sufficiently account for their interests as were gay people living in 
the four states that had gender-specific sodomy laws. 
Equality judicial review theorists have been effective in condition-
ing us to look for possible malfunctions in the democratic process as 
reflected in how legislation classifies individuals.265  But this condi-
tioning has unfortunately occluded the important representation-
reinforcing potential of judicial review based on liberty principles.  
The example of sodomy laws illustrates how the question of whether 
 
261 Morality was the principal state interest relied on by Texas to justify the enactment of its 
sodomy statute.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Texas attempts to 
justify its law, and the effects of the law, by arguing that the statute satisfies rational basis 
review because it furthers the legitimate governmental interest of the promotion of mo-
rality.”).  The Lawrence Court quoted from Justice Stevens’s dissent in Hardwick to reject 
the notion that considerations of majoritarian morality were sufficient to justify a law that 
criminalized consensual sexual conduct among adults.  Id. at 577–78. 
262 Id. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that dec-
laration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination 
both in the public and in the private spheres.”). 
263 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?  Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Mar-
riage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 32 (2003) (“Rather than invalidating the Texas statute on 
grounds of substantive due process, the Court should have invoked the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down, as irrational, the state’s decision to ban homosexual sodomy but 
not heterosexual sodomy.”); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken:  Sex 
Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081 (2004) (arguing that the Lawrence 
Court should have struck statute down on substantive sex equality grounds rather than 
substantive due process ones). 
264 At the time Lawrence was decided, thirteen states still criminalized consensual sodomy, “of 
which 4 enforce[d] their laws only against homosexual conduct.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
573.  The four states with gender specific sodomy statutes were Kansas, Missouri, Okla-
homa, and Texas.  Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6–3, Legalize Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping 
Reversal of Court’s ‘86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A1.  The nine states with gender 
neutral sodomy laws were Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caroli-
na, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.  Id. 
265 See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text. 
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courts can help achieve the goals of representational government is 
not as closely correlated to the nature of the constitutional claim 
(that is, whether it sounds in equality or in liberty) as some believe.  
Instead, a proper understanding of the role of judicial review should 
include a recognition that liberty-depriving measures, even when fa-
cially neutral, rarely impact everyone equally and that, as a result, 
there is a legitimate role for courts to play, in substantive due process 
cases, in making sure that legislators abide by minimum standards of 
representational government when enacting laws. 
B.  Remedial Legitimacy 
In 1949, the Supreme Court had before it the seemingly prosaic 
issue of whether a New York City traffic ordinance, which prohibited 
the placement of advertisement materials on a vehicle unless they 
were related to the vehicle owner’s business, passed constitutional 
muster under due process and equal protection principles.266  The 
Court ruled without much difficulty that the ordinance was constitu-
tional.267  But what the case is today mostly remembered for is a con-
curring opinion written by Justice Robert Jackson in which he articu-
lated his reasons for preferring to strike down legislation under equal 
protection principles rather than under due process ones.268 
When a court relies on substantive due process review to void leg-
islation, Jackson explained, it deprives the government of the author-
ity to legislate in a particular area, thus “leav[ing] ungoverned and 
ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable.”269  In 
contrast, when a court relies on equal protection principles to strike 
down a law, it does not, as a remedial matter, deprive the State of the 
authority to regulate in a certain area; instead, it merely renders 
invalid the classification that the legislature used to achieve its ends.270  
Rather than precluding legislation, the striking down of a law on 
equality grounds may induce legislators to go back and draft new laws 
that “have a broader impact.”271 
According to Justice Jackson, the impact of equality review is salu-
tary because it requires elected representatives to test the appro-
priateness of their policy objectives against the views and preferences 
 
266 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
267 Id. at 109–110 
268 Id. at 111–12 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
269 Id. at 112. 
270 Id. (“Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable any governmental 
body from dealing with the subject at hand.”). 
271 Id. 
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of a larger (perhaps even a majority) segment of the voting public.  
In a passage that has become particularly famous, he explained that 
[t]he framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, 
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law 
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.  
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to 
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply 
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be vi-
sited upon them if larger numbers were affected.  Courts can take no bet-
ter measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be 
equal in operation.272 
Justice Jackson, then, made two distinct points in supporting his 
preference for equality review over liberty review.  First, he argued 
that when the latter leads to the striking down of laws, it limits legisla-
tive discretion to a significantly greater extent than the former be-
cause it makes certain areas of human conduct “ungoverned and un-
governable.”  Second, and in contrast, the striking down of legislation 
on equality grounds simply encourages legislators to draft laws with “a 
broader impact.”  (This, in turn, protects citizens against “arbitrary 
and unreasonable government” because it makes legislators vulnera-
ble to the disapproval of a larger block of voters.)  In this last section 
of the Article, I use gay rights issues to explain why neither of these 
points is always correct. 
1.  Liberty Review and Limitations on Legislative Discretion 
The issue of same-sex marriage may, at first blush, seem to sup-
port Justice Jackson’s first point.  A successful due process challenge 
to same-sex marriage bans seems more intrusive of legislative prerog-
atives because it appears to leave the government with little choice 
but to make marriage available to same-sex couples.273  In contrast, 
when a court strikes down a same-sex marriage ban on equality 
grounds, the government retains the option of ending the institution 
 
272 Id. at 112–13; see also ELY, supra note 12, at 170 (“The function of the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . is largely to protect against substantive outrages by requiring that those who 
would harm others must at the same time harm themselves—or at least widespread ele-
ments of the constituency on which they depend for reelection . . . .”); Karst, supra note 
15, at 281 (“[W]hen the legislators decide on their response [to the striking down of leg-
islation on equal protection grounds], they must confront the fairness of the proposed 
regulation in the knowledge that an effective constituency is looking over their shoul-
ders.”). 
273 See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1405–06 (“[I]f a liberty interest in civil mar-
riage . . . were guaranteed by substantive due process, a proposal to abolish it would seem 
to raise serious constitutional concerns.”). 
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of marriage altogether as a way of curing the constitutional viola-
tion.274  This is because if everyone is denied the opportunity to mar-
ry, there can be no equal protection violation.275 
The apparent greater legislative flexibility that would follow an 
equality-based same-sex marriage ruling, however, is of little practical 
significance since it is exceedingly unlikely, at least in the near future, 
that legislators would get rid of marriage altogether.  This means, as a 
practical (as opposed to a theoretical) matter, that there is no initial 
remedial difference between striking down same-sex marriage bans 
on liberty grounds as opposed to equality ones.  The actual effect of 
both types of rulings on the ability of the legislature to continue to 
use the sex of prospective spouses as an exclusionary criterion in dis-
tributing marriage licenses would be exactly the same. 
It may also be argued that when courts strike down same-sex mar-
riage bans on equality principles, they allow for greater legislative 
flexibility by making it possible for the State to abide by its constitu-
tional obligations without having to make marriage available to same-
sex couples.  Indeed, some state supreme courts, after concluding 
that withholding the rights and benefits that accompany marriage 
from same-sex couples violates equality principles under their state 
constitutions, have sent the issue back to the legislature, giving it the 
opportunity to cure the constitutional violation by creating compre-
hensive but distinct relationship-regulation mechanisms such as civil 
unions.276  This type of remedial flexibility has an “obvious attraction 
[because] it throws the political initiative back to officials who are 
elected.”277 
 
274 See Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2084 (noting that if the right to marry falls under the “fun-
damental rights” branch of equal protection doctrine, “states may abolish marriage with-
out offending the Constitution”). 
275 See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1406 (“[A] state could constitutionally abolish its 
civil marriage system without offending the Constitution so long as it denied access to 
marriage for everyone.”). 
276 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221–22 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 
(Vt. 1999).  Other courts have rejected the notion that the constitutional infirmities of 
same-sex marriage bans can be addressed through a separate regulatory mechanism such 
as that of civil unions.  See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 
2008) (“We conclude that . . . because the institution of marriage carries with it a status 
and significance that the newly created classification of civil unions does not embody, the 
segregation of heterosexual and homosexual couples into separate institutions constitutes 
a cognizable harm.”); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 
2004) (“The dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not inno-
cuous; it is a considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of 
same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.”). 
277 Karst, supra note 15, at 282.  Karst here was referring to the general appeal of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a source of constitutional review rather than to the merits of institut-
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In contrast, it may seem that the Due Process Clause allows for re-
duced legislative flexibility because what is at issue in liberty chal-
lenges to same-sex marriage bans is whether same-sex couples have a 
fundamental right to marry.  This reasoning can be questioned, how-
ever, because the fundamental right at issue in the marriage cases, 
properly understood, is not the right to have one’s relationship rec-
ognized using a particular label such as that of “marriage” as opposed 
to “civil union” or “domestic partnership.”  It is hardly surprising, of 
course, that the substantive due process cases involving the relation-
ships of both heterosexual and same-sex couples have centered 
around the institution of marriage given that, until very recently, it 
was the only way through which the government provided recogni-
tion for committed and intimate relationships.  But if there is an af-
firmative constitutional right grounded in liberty to have those rela-
tionships recognized—an issue that I have explored elsewhere and 
cannot fully address here278—it must be because the recognition it-
self—independent of questions of labels or of the particular package 
of rights and obligations that accompany it—is an important means 
through which individuals exercise their autonomy or liberty inter-
ests.279  If I am correct about this, the State should be able meet its 
constitutional obligations under liberty principles in this area by pro-
viding meaningful recognition of committed and intimate same-sex 
relationships.  The fact that that recognition might take different 
forms depending on the couples’ sexual orientation undoubtedly 
raises constitutional questions, but they are ones of equality and not 
of liberty because they go to the issue of differential treatment. 
It is also important to keep in mind that even if a court were to 
hold that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional because they 
violate substantive due process principles, it would not impact the 
 
ing an alternative relationship-recognition mechanism for same-sex couples.  The crea-
tion of such a mechanism has been criticized by many as constituting a “separate but 
equal treatment” of lesbians and gay men, one that violates constitutional equality protec-
tions.  See, e.g., David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples 
When It Imposes Civil Unions & Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73 
(2005). 
278 See Ball, supra note 150, at 1191–1207. 
279 See Pamela S. Karlan, Can States Abolish the Institution of Marriage?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 
699 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s substantive due process cases involving mar-
riage . . . suggest that the freedom to marry—or at least the right of individuals to some form of 
official recognition for their family relationships—may be a liberty too fundamental to elimi-
nate.” (emphasis added)); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 74 (Cal. 2009) (stating 
that the fundamental right at issue in assessing the state’s same-sex marriage ban was not 
the “constitutional right to marry” but was “the constitutional right to establish an official-
ly recognized family relationship with the person of one’s choice.”). 
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many other ways in which the government regulates marriage.  The 
State, for example, would still be able to require certain blood tests 
and a minimum age for those who wish to marry.  And, more impor-
tantly, the government would still be free to decide which rights and 
obligations accompany the institution of marriage.280  In other words, 
if the Supreme Court were to hold that the fundamental right to 
marry applies to same-sex couples, it would not render marriage, in 
Justice Jackson’s words, “ungoverned and ungovernable.”281 
Interestingly, it may be that rulings upholding equality challenges 
to same-sex marriage bans place greater restrictions—again, as a prac-
tical matter—on the ability of the government to legislate in areas re-
lated to sexuality and relationships than liberty-based rulings.  To see 
why this may be the case, it is helpful to think through what the im-
pact of Lawrence might have been on the constitutionality of gay mar-
riage bans had the Court decided that case on equality as opposed to 
liberty grounds.  In his majority opinion in Lawrence striking down 
Texas’s sodomy statute on due process grounds, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy sought to distinguish between the constitutional authority 
of the State to criminalize same-gender sexual conduct and its obliga-
tion to recognize same-gender relationships.  Kennedy noted that 
sodomy “statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that, 
 
280 See Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 686 (2010) (“It is . . . pretty 
clear that the ‘right to marry’ does not obligate the state to offer any particular package 
of civil benefits to people who marry.”); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 
(Cal. 2008) (noting that “the constitutional right to marry clearly does not obligate the 
state to afford specific tax or other governmental benefits on the basis of a couple’s family 
relationship”). 
281 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
A similar type of limited impact would have followed a Supreme Court ruling striking 
down, on due process grounds, the (now repealed) “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” military per-
sonnel policy.  Even if the Court had done so, the military would have still retained wide 
discretion to regulate the personal conduct of its service members.  See United States v. 
Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 207 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (holding that military’s prohibition against 
consensual sodomy was not facially unconstitutional under Lawrence given that there are 
“additional factors relevant solely in the military environment that affect the nature and 
reach of the Lawrence liberty interest”).    
   There is also little reason to believe that a ruling striking down a same-sex marriage 
ban on due process grounds would be any more likely to limit the ability of the govern-
ment to prohibit incestuous or polygamous marriages than a decision based on equal 
protection considerations.  Indeed, it might be easier for those in incestuous or polygam-
ous relationships to persuade courts that they have an equality-based right to the privileg-
es and benefits afforded to others through the institution of marriage than that they en-
joy a liberty-based right to have their relationships recognized by the State.  This has been 
true of gay plaintiffs challenging same-sex marriage bans—they have more frequently 
succeeded with equality claims than with liberty ones, see supra note 167—and there is lit-
tle reason to believe that it would be different for members of other groups. 
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whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty 
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”282  He 
then added that the case before the Court did “not involve whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationships 
that homosexual persons seek to enter.”283 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s efforts to distinguish between the issues 
of sodomy and marriage, I have argued elsewhere that the Court’s 
marriage cases, along with Lawrence v. Texas, may be understood as 
imposing an affirmative, due process-based obligation on the State to 
recognize same-sex relationships.284  This type of argument, however, 
is controversial—it has been accepted by only one appellate court285 
and explicitly rejected by several others.286  Some commentators have 
also contended that it makes no sense to think of same-sex marriage 
bans as raising substantive due process issues and that, as a result, 
courts should only look to equal protection considerations when as-
sessing their constitutionality.287  This view is based, in part, on the be-
lief that the Due Process Clause prohibits the government from inter-
fering with certain negative liberty rights of individuals but does not 
 
282 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasis added). 
283 Id. at 578. 
284 See generally Ball, supra note 150. 
285 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 426 (“[I]t is apparent under the California Constitution 
that the right to marry—like the right to establish a home and raise children—has inde-
pendent substantive content, and cannot properly be understood as simply the right to en-
ter into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses to establish and retain 
it.”); id. (“[T]he constitutional right to marry . . . goes beyond what is sometimes charac-
terized as simply a ‘negative’ right insulating the couple’s relationship from overreaching 
governmental intrusion or interference, and includes a ‘positive’ right to have the state 
take at least some affirmative action to acknowledge and support the family unit.”). 
286 See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“We view [Law-
rence] as acknowledging a homosexual person’s right to define his or her own existence, 
and achieve the type of individual fulfillment that is a hallmark of a free society, by enter-
ing into a homosexual relationship.  We do not view [Lawrence] as stating that such a right 
includes the choice to enter a state-sanctioned, same-sex marriage.”); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (“Plaintiffs here do not, as the petitioners in Law-
rence did, seek protection against state intrusion on intimate, private activity.  They [in-
stead] seek from the courts access to a state-conferred benefit that the Legislature has ra-
tionally limited to opposite-sex couples.”). 
287 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2111 (“In specifying the scope of the right to marry, 
the real question is the legitimacy of the lines that states draw.  If that is the question, it is 
appropriate to consult not the Due Process Clause, but the antidiscrimination principles 
of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1406 (arguing 
that “the right to civil marriage is primarily grounded in the Equal Protection Clause ra-
ther than the Due Process Clause”); see also id. at 1395 (“[L]iberty alone is probably the 
wrong framework for thinking about the right to marry.  Civil marriage, after all, is a gov-
ernment created and government regulated status.”). 
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impose on it affirmative obligations, including any related to relation-
ship recognition.288 
All of this means that the Lawrence Court’s choice to strike down 
Texas’s sodomy statute on due process grounds has not had much of 
an impact on the constitutional validity of same-sex marriage bans.  
As one commentator puts it, 
one can readily observe that the litigation in support of same-sex mar-
riage has not changed much since June of 2003 when Lawrence was 
handed down.  That is, such litigation has not been more or less success-
ful, nor has it met a markedly more or less receptive audience.  For all of 
its sweeping language and in spite of its ecstatic reception by so many, 
Lawrence has had virtually no discernable impact on the on-going wave of 
litigation around same-sex marriage.289 
It is not clear, however, that the same would have been true had 
the Court decided Lawrence on equal protection grounds.  An equali-
ty-based ruling in Lawrence would have allowed proponents of same-
sex marriage to rely on it as a precedent without having to grapple 
with the question, already noted, of whether substantive due process 
provides individuals with affirmative rights.290  In addition, if the Law-
rence Court had decided the case on equal protection grounds, it 
would have had to determine the role that considerations of majori-
tarian morality can play, under equality principles, in establishing 
 
288 Cass Sunstein has argued that 
[s]ubstantive due process rights . . . , such as the right to freedom from govern-
mental interference in the domain of consensual sex, . . . involve a right to free-
dom from government intrusion, rather than a right of access to a state-created 
practice.  And this very point suggests that the Court has erred insofar as it has 
treated the right to marry as part of substantive due process rather than as part of 
the fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine. 
  Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2096; see also Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1378 (arguing 
that “civil marriage is a government program that provides certain benefits and imposes 
certain obligations.  In this respect, it differs from other family-related liberties, [ones 
that] exist independent of government involvement, and . . . enjoy protection against 
state interference under substantive due process doctrine.”). 
289 Justin Reinheimer, What Lawrence Should Have Said:  Reconstructing an Equality Approach, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 505, 519 (2008).  The one appellate court that, in striking down a same-
sex marriage ban, made significant references to Lawrence was the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.  The Massachusetts court noted 
that the Lawrence 
Court affirmed that the core concept of common human dignity protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes government 
intrusion into the deeply personal realms of consensual adult expressions of inti-
macy and one’s choice of an intimate partner.  The Court also reaffirmed the cen-
tral role that decisions whether to marry or have children bear in shaping one’s 
identity. 
  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
290 See supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text. 
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how the State regulates the relationships of gay people.291  If the 
Court had held that such considerations constituted an impermissible 
basis upon which to treat gay people differently from straight people, 
then it is not clear that the long history and tradition of limiting mar-
riage to heterosexuals could serve as a justification for denying gay 
people the opportunity to marry when such a choice is made availa-
ble to heterosexuals.  As Justice Antonin Scalia accurately noted in his 
Lawrence dissent, “‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ 
is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of 
same-sex couples.”292 
All of this suggests that had the Court decided Lawrence on equal 
protection grounds, it likely would have limited the ability of the gov-
ernment to legislate in matters related to sexuality and relationships 
to a greater extent than it actually did by deciding the case on due 
process grounds.293  Indeed, although we may never know for sure, it 
is reasonable to surmise that the Lawrence majority decided the case 
on due process grounds in part because it understood that the gov-
ernment’s discretion to regulate in other sexuality-related matters—
including not only marriage, but also those involving issues such as 
the now repealed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and whether lesbians 
 
291 As already noted, Texas relied on considerations of morality to defend the constitutional 
legitimacy of its sodomy law.  See supra note 261 and accompanying text.  Although the 
Lawrence Court held, as a matter of due process, that the State cannot rely on morality 
considerations to prohibit “a particular practice,” see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)), it did not address the question of morality from an equal protection perspective.  
See id. at 574–75 (explaining that it was deciding the case under due process, and not 
equality, principles).  For a discussion of the role that morality played in Lawrence, see Car-
los A. Ball, The Proper Role of Morality in State Policies on Sexual Orientation and Intimate Rela-
tionships, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 88–93 (2011). 
292 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia here was specifically res-
ponding to Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that while sodomy laws are unconstitutional, 
same-sex marriage bans are not because “unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex rela-
tions—the asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institu-
tion of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”  Id. at 585 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  She added that one of those reasons might be the need to 
“preserv[e] the traditional institution of marriage.”  Id. 
293 I want to emphasize that my argument here does not go to the question of whether the 
Court was correct in deciding Lawrence on liberty as opposed to on equality grounds.  I al-
so want to make it clear that I am not suggesting that it would have been problematic if 
the Court had decided Lawrence on equal protection grounds because of the extent to 
which it would have restricted the government’s ability to regulate in matters related to 
sexuality and relationships.  Indeed, I generally support restricting the ability of the gov-
ernment to regulate in these matters.  My point is simply that the widely accepted view 
that the striking down of legislation on liberty grounds imposes greater restrictions on 
the ability of the government to regulate than does the voiding of legislation under equal-
ity review is not always correct. 
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and gay men should be permitted to adopt children—would be more 
extensively curtailed if it relied on equal protection principles to 
strike down Texas’s sodomy statute.294 
As we have seen, a perceived remedial benefit of equality review 
over liberty review is that the former is thought to be more respectful 
and less intrusive of the political process and of the legislature’s pre-
rogatives.295  But, as I have explained here, it is not always clear that 
the remedy that follows a successful due process challenge is any 
more restrictive of the government’s authority to regulate than is a 
successful equality challenge.296  In fact, it may very well be that rul-
ings upholding challenges on equality grounds are, in some in-
stances, more restrictive of the government’s authority to determine 
whether and how to regulate than ones based on substantive due 
process considerations.297 
2.  Equality Review and Broader Impact Legislation 
As noted earlier,298 Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion 
explaining his preference for equality review over liberty review em-
phasized that a successful equal protection challenge encourages leg-
islators to go back and enact laws that have “a broader impact” in or-
der to address the constitutional violation.299  This, in turn, helps 
protect against “arbitrary and unreasonable government” because 
legislators are less likely to impose unreasonable burdens on a larger 
group of citizens (read:  voters) than on a smaller one.300  This point 
is one that continues to be emphasized in more contemporary times 
by those who argue on behalf of the greater legitimacy of equality 
judicial review over liberty review.  For example, Justice Scalia, in cri-
ticizing the notion of liberty-based limitations on the State’s constitu-
tional authority to regulate, has contended that what places “reason-
able and humane” limits on the ability of the government to interfere 
with the important decisions of individuals “is the Equal Protection 
 
294 See Karlan, Loving Lawrence, supra note 34, at 1460 (“The Court may have feared that if it 
struck down Texas’s statute on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to 
treat gay people differently from straight people, this would require it to invalidate all 
laws that treat gay and straight couples differently, the most obvious of which are laws re-
stricting the right to marry.”). 
295 See supra notes 265–79 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 273–81 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 282–94 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
299 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
300 Id. 
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Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for them-
selves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”301 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor expressed a similar sentiment in her 
concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas when she took issue with the Court’s 
decision to strike down the sodomy statute on due process grounds.302  
A better alternative, O’Connor contended, would have been to do so 
on equal protection principles.303  This was not only because the sta-
tute explicitly targeted gay people for differential treatment on the 
constitutionally impermissible basis of moral disapproval,304 but also 
because the striking down of gender-specific sodomy laws like Texas’s 
under the Equal Protection Clause would render facially neutral sta-
tutes vulnerable to repeal through the democratic process.  As 
O’Connor put it (immediately before quoting Justice Jackson’s fam-
ous passage),305 “I am confident . . . that so long as the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private con-
sensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law 
would not long stand in our democratic society.”306 
Yet, there is reason to be skeptical of the notion that legislation 
which has a broader impact (and which therefore addresses equal 
protection concerns) is enough to protect the interests of minorities, 
including sexual ones.  It should be noted, for example, that most 
sodomy statutes in American history were of the “broad impact” varie-
ty—the vast majority of sodomy laws enacted by state legislatures over 
the last two centuries made no distinctions based on the gender of 
the sexual actors and thus, on their face, applied to everyone.307  Far 
from being intolerant of sodomy laws with a broad impact, however, 
our democratic system let them stand for a very long time indeed. 
It is true that, starting in 1961, several state legislatures repealed 
their facially neutral sodomy laws, but they did so largely as part of a 
wholesale adoption of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code rather than as a result of any discernable political pressure from 
 
301 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Cruzan involved the question of whether states can require terminally ill individuals to ac-
cept life-prolonging treatment.  See id. at 269. 
302 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I joined 
Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it.”). 
303 See id. 
304 Id. at 580 (“We have consistently held . . . that some objectives, such as ‘a bare  . . .  desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state interests.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
305 See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
306 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584–85. 
307 See BALL, supra note 75, at 207. 
74 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
sexually active heterosexuals concerned about their potential crimi-
nal liability under those laws.308  This lack of majoritarian pressure is 
hardly surprising since, as already noted, facially neutral sodomy laws 
in the middle of the twentieth century were widely understood as 
aimed primarily at same-sex sexual conduct (in particular that be-
tween men).309  Heterosexuals rarely think of themselves as individu-
als who engage in sodomy,310 even if many sexually active ones seem 
to participate in that conduct with some regularity.311  There is no 
reason to believe, therefore, that had the Lawrence Court struck down 
the Texas sodomy statute on equal protection grounds, it would have 
led political majorities in states that had facially neutral sodomy laws 
to demand that their legislatures repeal them.312  Indeed, if Alabama 
voters, for example, fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education,313 re-
fused to approve a ballot measure that would have removed from the 
state constitution a provision requiring racially segregated schools,314 
it is not clear that they would have ever demanded repeal of their 
state’s gender-neutral sodomy law.  The case of sodomy legislation, 
 
308 See Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash:  Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT 
Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 171 (2009) (“Twenty state legislatures . . . repealed their 
sodomy laws in the 1970s and early 1980s—generally as part of a wholesale adoption of 
the Model Penal Code . . . .”).  The Model Penal Code, in calling for the abolition of con-
sensual sodomy laws, did so on liberty, rather than on equality, grounds.  See Model Penal 
Code § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1962), reprinted in RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 147 (noting 
that sodomy laws “sacrifice[] personal liberty, not because the actor’s conduct results in 
harm to another citizen but only because it is inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of 
acceptable behavior”). 
309 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
310 See Tribe, supra note 34, at 1905 (“Many heterosexuals, even those who regularly engage 
in one or another form of opposite-sex sodomy, no doubt associate ‘sodomy’ with acts 
that strike them as perverse and alien.”). 
311 A comprehensive study of Americans’ sexual practices conducted by University of Chica-
go researchers found that 79% of all men and 73% of all women engage in oral sex, while 
26% of all men and 20% of all women engage in anal sex.  EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 98–99 (1994). 
312 As Laurence Tribe has noted, 
[l]ike the fabled Sword of Damocles that does its awful work not by beheading its 
victim but simply by dangling above its victim’s neck, even a sex-neutral ban on 
sodomy, especially one blessed by the Court, demeans intimate homosexual rela-
tionships at the same time that its virtually complete nonenforcement greatly re-
duces the incentive of heterosexuals, who are not demeaned by such a ban, to agi-
tate for its repeal. 
  Tribe, supra note 34, at 1910 (footnote omitted). 
313 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
314 “The constitutional amendment would have struck language from the Alabama constitu-
tion saying that ‘separate schools shall be provided for white and colored children, and 
no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school of the other race.’”  Susan 
Pace Hammill, Book Review, A Tale of Two Alabamas, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1103, 1142 (2007)  
(citations omitted). 
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then, suggests that the Equal Protection Clause is not necessarily (as 
Justice Scalia has put it) our “salvation”315 when it comes to legislation 
that overreaches by limiting the ability of individuals to make impor-
tant decisions about their intimate and personal lives. 
As I have sought to explain in this part of the Article, gay rights 
cases raise important questions about the widely accepted idea that 
successful liberty-based challenges to legislation impose greater limi-
tations on legislative discretion than do equality-based lawsuits.316  
They also raise questions about the notion that successful equality-
based challenges, and the resulting incentives to broaden the impact 
of legislation, always serve to protect against “arbitrary and unreason-
able government” actions, reducing the necessity for courts to engage 
in meaningful liberty review.317 
CONCLUSION 
When the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked in 2006 to rule on 
the constitutionality of the state’s ban on same-sex marriage, it ex-
pressed serious reservations about the legitimacy of doing so on liber-
ty grounds.  As the court explained, 
[i]n searching for the meaning of “liberty” . . .  we must resist the tempta-
tion of seeing in the majesty of that word only a mirror image of our own 
strongly felt opinions and beliefs.  Under the guise of newly found rights, 
we must be careful not to impose our personal value system on eight-and-
one-half million people, thus bypassing the democratic process as the 
primary means of effecting social change in this State.318 
And yet, when it came to reviewing the same legislation under 
equality principles, the court a few pages later expressed complete 
confidence in the legitimacy of its judicial role, noting at one point 
that “[u]ltimately, we have the responsibility of ensuring that every 
New Jersey citizen receives the full protection of our State Constitu-
tion.”319  The disparity in the court’s understanding of its own legiti-
 
315 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
316 See supra notes 265–96 and accompanying text. 
317 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); 
see supra notes 297–315 and accompanying text. 
318 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006). 
319 Id. at 220 (emphasis added); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
481 (Conn. 2008) (“[W]e do not exceed our authority by mandating equal treatment for 
gay persons; in fact, any other action would be an abdication of our responsibility.”). 
 The Lewis court proceeded to hold that same-sex couples were constitutionally en-
titled to the same rights and benefits afforded under state law to different-sex married 
couples, but that that entitlement did not include the right to have their relationships 
recognized as marital.  See Lewis, 908 A.2d. at 221–22. 
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macy based on the underlying constitutional claim is striking, espe-
cially considering that while the New Jersey Constitution expressly 
protects the “unalienable rights” of citizens to “liberty,” it does not 
mention a right to the equal protection of the laws.320 
The New Jersey court’s view that judicial review on equality 
grounds is more legitimate than review on liberty principles is widely 
shared in legal circles.  An important reason for this legitimacy dis-
parity is the view that there is an intrinsic subjectivity that accompa-
nies liberty review that is absent from equality review.  I have tried in 
this Article to show why this belief is neither conceptually correct321 
nor reflective of what happens in practice, at least in gay rights consti-
tutional litigation.322  I have also used gay rights cases to question the 
widely shared perception that the degree of institutional and remedi-
al legitimacy of equality review is significantly greater than that of li-
berty review.323 
If I am correct that the legitimacy of judicial review grounded in 
liberty principles is comparable to that of equality review, then we 
should question the skepticism (and lessen the hand-wringing) that 
usually accompanies it.  This does not mean, of course, that there is 
less of a reason to question the particular decisions that courts make 
in applying substantive due process principles in particular cases.  But 
it does mean that if we are generally comfortable with the idea of 
judges measuring state action against constitutional principles of 
equality, then we should also be generally comfortable with judges 
doing the same with constitutional principles of liberty. 
 
320 See N.J. CONST., art. 1. para. 1.  (The state supreme court had previously concluded that 
the right to equal protection is implicit in the constitution’s “unalienable rights” provi-
sion, the same one that mentions liberty specifically.  Lewis, 908 A.2d at 211–12.)  Given 
the general skepticism of substantive due process review, it is interesting, but not particu-
larly surprising, that the court failed to mention the stronger textual basis for liberty re-
view over equality review under the state constitution. 
321 See infra Part I. 
322 See infra Part II. 
323 See infra Part III. 
